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MASSACHUSETTS TRUSTS
In a recent Illinois case 2 the supreme court of that state found
it necessary to deal with the "Mysterious Massachusetts Trust." -
Three gentlemen from Chicago, one of whom was the defendant,
journeyed to Boston and there drew up and signed a declaration
of trust 3 designating themselves trustees. This instrument con-
I Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 159 N. E. 250 (Ill. 1927).
2Cook, Mysterious Massachusettg Tr-ust (1923) 9 Aiui. BAR Ass'N J.
763.
3The -rustees were to be collectively designated as the "Goodland Com-
pany," and under such name were to manage the trust estate, execute all
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tained the customary provision 4 that neither the trustees nor the
shareholders should be personally responsible to creditors, but
that the latter should look only to the trust property. The docu-
ment was duly recorded with the Commissioner of Taxation and
Corporations according to the Massachusetts statute 5 and was
also deposited with the Massachusetts Trust Company in Boston.
The trust was formed for the purpose of dealing in California
real estate, and apparently there was an office in that state and
one in Chicago. Failure subsequently overtook the enterprise.
The present litigation arose over a sum of money due the plain-
tiff on a contract entered into by the trustees. The plaintiff
filed her bill against the defendant and others as trustees, as co-
partners, and as individuals. The defendant and another, M,
the only defendants served, answered. The chancellor entered
a decree against M, individually, on the grounds of fraud, and
against M and the defendant,.as trustees, for a like amount, but
payable only out of the trust property. The bill was dismissed
as to the defendant individuals and as to the defendant and M
as copartners. After affirmance of the dismissals in an inter-
mediate appellate court, the plaintiff took her case to the su-
preme court on a writ of certiorari. In affirming the appellate
court, the supreme court held that the declaration of trust in
question reserved to the "unassociated" shareholders no "con-
trol" over the trustees and therefore the organization was a
trust and not a partnership; that the trustees had expressly
stipulated against personal responsibility in their contract; 0 and
writings, etc. The trustees were empowered to change the name of the
trust, to increase the number of vacancies, to fill any vacancies caused by
death, resignation or otherwise, and to fill all places created by an increase
in the number of trustees. The trustees were given the absolute and ex-
clusive control of all the trust property and the share holders were specific-
ally deprived of any voice in the management. The trustees were given
the power to fix their own compensation and that of all employes of the com-
pany. It was provided that all contracts of the trustees should be taken to
have been executed in their capacity as trustees under the declaration of
trust, and it was required that all contracts should recite that the same
were executed by the trustees as such and not individually. The trustees
were prohibited from making a contract which bound the shareholders, and
it was required that every contract state that it was enforceable against
and payable out of the funds of the trust only and that there should be no
personal responsibility of the trustees or shareholders. The duration of
the trust was fixed for 21 years after the death of the last survivor of
the original trustees. The only rights possessed by the shareholders were
the rights to dividends to be declared at the trustees' discretion, and a
right to a proportionate share of the estate upon dissolution.
4 Supra note 3.
5 Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 182. Amended Mass. Cumul. Stat. (1927) c.
182.
6 The contract contained this provision: "This obligation is executed in
behalf of the trustees under the declaration of trust made and delivered at
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also that the defendant had had no active part in M's fraud.
The opinion is rather obscure, but the court lays down the
dictum that the shareholders are not responsible as partners, if
the terms of the declaration of trust contain the stipulations
against shareholder "control" above set forth, and if there is
no "association" among the shareholders.
The term "Massachusetts trust," otherwise known as the
"business" or "common law" trust is used generally to denote
an unincorporated organization created for profit under a writ-
ten instrument 8 or declaration of trust, the management to be
conducted by compensated trustees for the benefit of persons
whose legal interests 9 are represented by transferable certificates
of participation, or shares. The purposes' 0 for which such an
organization may be formed are apparently without limit in
the absence of statutory restrictions."'
As early as 1854, a reference is made to the use of this organi-
Boston, Massachusetts, and deposited with the Massachusetts Trust Com-
pany, not individually but as trustees to bind the trust estate." The con-
tract was signed: "Goodland Company, by Albert G. Hines, Pres. & Trustee
-Attest: Richard S. Folsom, Secretary" (defendant). The seal attached
bore the words, "Goodland Company, organized under declaration of trust
dated May 21, 1919 at Boston, Mass."
7 To avoid any technical objection to the term "association," and in order
to be consistent throughout this article, "organization" will refer to Massa-
chusetts trusts in general, regardless of whether it is ultimately held to be
a partnership or trust or corporation. "Trust," unless otherwise indicated,
will refer to these organizations which the courts have designated as so-
called "strict", "pure,; or "true" trusts.
8 For copies of these instruments see WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCORNOATED
ASSOCIATIONS AND BusiNEss TRusTs (2d ed. 1923) 445 et seq.; SEARs, TnUST
ESTATES As BUsiNESS CosiPAmEs (2d ed. 1921) 418 et seq.; Du.N, Busi-
NEss TRuSTs (1922) 420 et seq.
9 The usual expression is that the "beneficial interests are divided into
units." This is clearly true so far as the rights to vote and to dividends are
concerned, regardless of what the court ultimately holds the organization
to be. But the detrimental relations would not be so divided if the organi-
zation were held to be a partnership. As to the pro -rata detrimental rela-
tions in case the organization is held a trust, see infra note 76.
310 Mayo v. Moritz, 151 Mass. 481, 24 N. E. 1083 (1890) (to hold, manage
and dispose of patents); Baker v. Commissioners, 253 Mlass. 130, 148 N. E.
593 (1925) (realty development); Marchulonis v. Adams, 97 W. Va. 517,
125 S. E. 340 (1924) (coal mining); Betts v. Hackathorn, 159 Ark. 621, 252
S. W. 602, 31 A. L. R. 851 (1924) annotation (oil business); Hoadley v.
Commissioners, 105 Mlass. 519 (1870) (manufacturing); Liquid Carbonic
Co. v. Sullivan, 103 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561 (1924) (bottling works); Darling
v. Buddy, 1 S. W. (2d) 163 (Mo. 1928) (railroad). See also FLETCHUS,
ENCYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1920) § 6062 and SEARs, op. cit. su~pra, note
8, § 184, n. 8.
- Regard must be paid to statutes limiting express trusts to specific
objects. Also state and federal anti-trust legislation must be considered.
See FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 10, c. 54 entitled "Trusts and Mlonopolie3."
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zation 12 for holding land. Its appearance is said to be due to the
fact that corporations were not permitted to be formed under
the general incorporation statutes in Massachusetts for the pur-
pose of dealing in and developing real estate, and that attempts
to create such corporations by special act met with practically
no success. 3  This organization filled a pressing need which
otherwise it would have been impossible tomeet. Real estate
developments in Boston and its environs, 4 with the resulting
increased taxes, no doubt had some effect upon the willingness
of the courts of that Commonwealth to sanction such real estate
development organizations, and rightly so. Having been upheld
for this specific purpose, it is not strange that these organiza-
tions were soon formed for the purpose of conducting a manu-
facturing business or operating a holding company, particularly
active in public utilities.15 The validity of these organizations
is now recognized by statute in that state.'0 From Massa-
chusetts 17 this organization was imported into various states for
sundry reasons. 8 It was used extensively throughout the South-
west,'9 principally in the oil business. It is impossible even to
12 In Atty. Gen. v. Fed. Street Meetinghouse, 3 Gray 1, 46 (Mass. 1854)
the court referred to companies "formed without incorporation, consisting
of numerous members, for the purchase of wild lands, with a view to re-
sale or other like purposes," where "the grant is made to trustees in trust
for several members designated, and a certificate of such right to an aliquot
part of the beneficial interest is usually issued by the trustees to the sev-
eral parties, indicating what aliquot part each holds in such trust property
or beneficial interest."
13 MASS. HousE DOCUMENTS, No. 1646 (1912) 13 et seq.
24 Ibid. 16, 17.
15 Ibid. 21 et seq. Also Ibid. No. 1788 (1913) generally.
16 Supra, note 5. The statute deals principally with the recording of the
declarations of trust and amendments, and the requirement that holding
companies in public utilities file certain accounts and offer books for inspec-
tion upon request.
17 Mr. Henry F. Long, Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation has
kindly written, "While I have no actual count I suspect that there are at
least fifteen hundred associations organized which are registered here with
me in this Department. Approximately two hundred and fifty of these have
registered dring the last two years." Cook., op. cit. supra note 2, at 768
says that in Massachusetts "only 64 Massachusetts Trusts registered in the
year ending Nov. 30, 1922." This would indicate an increase in the use
of these organizations despite Mr. Cook's remark that they "make a noise
out of all proportion to their size."
1s This' organization mighti be formed for any number of reasons: to
escape corporate taxes, or laws against foreign corporations, to gain limited
responsibility without incorporation, etc. As to the various advantages see
FLxTCHER, op. cit. supra note 10, § 6063. See also Thulin, A Survey of tiw
Business Trust (1922) 16 ILL. L. Rav. 370, also printed in (1922) 56 AM. L.
REV. 177; Wilgus, Corporations and Express Trusts (1914) 13 MICH. L. Rav.
71, 74 et seq.
19 In reply to an inquiry regarding these organizations in Texas before
and after Thompson v. Schmitt, infra note 51, Mr. John W. Martin, Blue
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estimate how many of these organizations are in existence thru-
out the country, but a glance at the increasing number of cases
in the section "Joint stock companies and business trusts" of
the American Digest System and a realization that this organi-
zation has been resorted to by various enterprises of consider-
able importance 20 in the United States would seem to justify a
further 21 consideration of this commercial device, as vell as an
analysis of the technique used by the courts when confronted
with this organization.
By way of illustrating the problem which confronts the courts,
two tax statutes might be considered: 22 one providing that per-
sonalty held in trust shall be assessed to the trustee in the city
in which the beneficiary resides; the other, that partners may
be jointly taxed under their firm name in the town in which
Sky Commissioner says, "There is no way to tell exactly the number of
common law trusts that were organized (before Thompson v. Schmitt),
but they very likely ran into thousands, and since this last decision men-
tioned, they have practically been abandoned."
20 Mr. Crotty in his article, The Business Trust (1922) 15 L.wivY
AND BANKER 205 gives the following list as of 1922: "lass. Elem Com-
panies, organized with a capital of $24,000,000; Associated Simmons Hard-
ward Companies of St. Louis, Mo. (the largest hardware company in the
world); Stevenson Lumber Co. of Michigan; North American Pulp & Paper
Co.; Adams Express Co.; The McKay Co.; American Express Co.; American
Trust Co.; Chicago Elevated Railroads; Chicago City Ry. Co.; Masonic
Temple Building Trust; Central Manufacturing District (capital $50,000,-
000) of Chicago; Edward Hines Lumber interests; Wachusett Realty
Trust; Postal Telegraph Co." To this might be added the Axnosleag Mfg.
Co., Manchester, N. H. the single largest woolen mill in this country and
perhaps in the world; also the Pepperell Mfg. Co. of Bideford, Me., and
Opelika, Ala.
21 Other articles on the subject not cited herein are: DVwxoNG, FINAN-
CiAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 13; CHANDLER, ExPRESs TausTs UN-
DER THE COMMON LAw (1912); THOMPSON, BUSINESS TRUSTS AS A SurSTX-
TUTE OF INCORPORATION (1920); Wrightington, Voluntary Associations in
Massachusetts (1912) 21 YALE LAw JOURNAL 311; Comment (1918) 27
YALE LAw JOURNAL 677; Comment (1919) 28 YALE LAw JounNAL 690;
Scott, Trust as an Instrument of Law Reform (1922) 31 Y=L LAw JOUn-
NAL 457, 467; Scott, Progress of the Law 1918-19 (1920) 33 H,%nv. L. REV.
688, 704; Stevens, Limited Liability in Business Trusts (1922) 7 Conu. L.
Q. 116; Aaron, The Massachusetts Trust as Distinguishcd from Parncr-
ship (1918) 12 ILL. L. REv. 482; Judah, Possible Partnership Liability Un.-
der the Business Trust (1922) 17 ILL. L. REv. 77, also printed in (1922)
56 Am. L. REv. 826; Comments (1922) 17 ILL. L. RBv. 316; ibid. 450;
Powell, The Passing of the Corporation in Business (1918) 2 MInm. L.
REV. 401; Comment (1923) 57 Au. L. REV. 434; Wrightington, Moder
Business Organizations (1917) 24 CASE AND COMMENT 184; Wrightington,
The Massachusetts Trust Farn of Organization (1921) 13 Am. B, M'
Ass'N J. 315.
22 Mass. Acts (1909) c. 490, part 1, § 23 cl. 5 and § 27. These are also
the statutes passed on in Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355
(1913).
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their business is carried on for all personal property employed
in the business. The question is: under which of these statutes
is the organization to be taxed? It is possible that the court
might admit the organization to be sui generis and approach
the problem from the angle of economic convenience and desira-
bility. Having determined the situs of taxation by such a pro-
cess, the organization might then be called a trust or a partner-
ship depending upon the tax statute applied. These terms would
thus be used, however, merely to describe the conclusion reached
and not the reason therefor.23  On the other hand, the court
may have faith in class logic and feel that the problem is not
that of passing on the desirability of applying one type of tax
statute rather than the other, but merely of determining whether
this organization is really a partnership or a trust. Once having
discovered "the nature" of the organization, i. e., partnership or
trust, by means of legal logic, 24 such a court is then bound to ap-
ply alleged partnership or trust principles, and to this organiza-
tion, regardless of whether the action involves the matter of tax-
ation, a creditor's suit or whatnot. Every court must either deter-
mine the legal consequences of a novel organization and then de-
scribe them by means of a name; 25 or else classify the organiza-
tion into some existing category and automatically attach to it the
legal consequences which usually accompany that category."
This paper is intended to examine the technique used by some
of the courts 27 in dealing with this strange commercial device.
In Massachusetts 2l8 and those states20 which have adopted the
23 See Cook, Scientific Method and The Law (1927) 13 ADIER. BAR ASs'N.
J. 303, 308.
24 The technique by which such a conclusion is reached will be discussed
infra.
25 See In re Associated Trust, 222 Fed. 1012 (D. Mass. 1914) where the
organization was called an "unincorporated company" within the meaning
of Bankruptcy Act, July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 4b; 30 Stat. 547 (1898), U. S.
Comp. Stat. (1913) § 9588. The Bankruptcy Act § 1, 6 as amended 1926,
expressly applies to these organizations now.
26 WRIGHTINGTON, Op. cit. supra note 8, at 8: "The newest law today con-
cerns the application of old principles to the new problems created by
associations for profit and trusts . . ." Thompson, J., speaking for the
Illinois Court in Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, supra note 1, at 252, says:
"If the declaration of trust ... creates a trust, . . . then the, decision ...
depends upon the application of well-established principles of the law of
contracts and trusts. Because a new use is being made of the trust does
not mean new principles of law are to be applied in determining the rights
of the trustees, the cestuis que trust or persons dealing with the trustees."
The faith in existing fixed categories is shown by the court in Ricker v.
Amer. Loan & Trust Co., 140 Mass. 346, 348 (1885) when it states that
"there is no intermediate form of organization between a corporation and
a partnership."
27 This paper does not pretend to be exhaustive.
28 Williams v. Milton, supra note 22. Taxation suit. There were to be
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no meetings of the shareholders who might only consent individually to an
alteration of the agreement or a termination thereof by the trustees before
the time fixed. Held: a trust.
Mayo v. Moritz, supra note 10. Action by creditor. Property was conveyed
to trustees who were to carry on the business without interference of the
shareholders, and the trustees were to fill their own vacanciez. Held: a
trust.
Baker v. Commissioners, supra note 10. Taxation. The trustees were
to fill their vacancies with consent of the majority of shareholders and
were empowered to alter, amend or terminate the agreement with consent
of three-fourths of the shareholders. Held: a trust.
Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 360, 106 N. E. 1009 (1914). Action by
creditor. Two-thirds of the shareholders might remove the trustees at
any time without cause and fill vacancies. Two-thirds might also alter,
amend or terminate the agreement at any time. There was a provision
for annual and special meetings of shareholders. Held: a partnership.
The opinion is, however, very obscure. See a discussion of the case,
WRIGHTINGTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 47. See also Horgan v. Morgan,
233 Mass. 381, 124 N. E. 32 (1919) a creditor's action involving the same
declaration of trust, in which the court says the shareholders are responsible
although they had thought they were buying non-assessible shares in
a corporation.
Hoadley v. Commissioners, s.pra note 10. Taxation suit. There was a
provision for meetings. The shareholders were to choose an executive
committee to conduct the business until another such committee would
be chosen. Duration was to be 30 years unless a majority of shareholders
voted to transfer to a corporation. Held: a partnership; the same declara-
tion of trust was passed on in Gleason v. McKay, 134 Mass. 419 (1883).
Whitman v. Porter, 107 Mass. 522 (1871). Suit by one shareholder against
another for contribution. Shareholders might elect trustees annually and
terminate organization by majority vote. Held: a partnership.
For other cases in which the organization has been called a partnership see
Ricker v. Amer. Loan & Trust Co. 140 Mass. 346, 5 N. E. 284 (1885)
(taxation suit); McCarthy v. Parker, 243 Mass. 465, 138 N. E. 8 (1923)
(creditor's action and also involving sufficiency of notice); Priestly v.
Treasurer, 230 Mass. 452, 120 N. E. 100 (1918) (taxation suit); Williams
v. Johnson, 208 Mass. 544, 95 N. E. 90 (1911) (petition for registration
of title. It is interesting to note that the same court, two years later,
in Williams v. Milton, supra note 22 at 12, 102 N. E. at 359 said they had
made a mistake and that the organization was a trust, but that that point
"was in no way essential to the decision"); Flint v. Codman, 247 Mass.
463, 142 N. E. 256 (1924) (bill by minority shareholders to enjoin sale
by trustees); Howe v. Chmielinski, 237 Mass. 532, 130 N. E. 56 (1921)
(fraudulent land scheme perpetrated by one partner); Neville v. Gifford,
242 Mass. 124, 136 N. E. 160 (1922) (creditor's action); Phillips v. Blatch-
ford, 137 Mass. 510 (1884) (bill for contribution by one partner against
another); Williams v. Boston, 208 Mass. 497, 94 N. E. 808 (1911) (taxa-
tion suit); Dana v. Treasurer, 227 Mass. 562, 116 N. E. 941 (1917) (taxa-
tion suit). Cf. Peabody v. Stevens, 215 Mass. 129, 102 N. E. 435 (1913);
Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202, 70 N. E. 87 (1904); Adams v. Swig,
234 Mass. 584, 125 N. E. 857 (1920); Rand v. Farquhar, 226 Mass. 91,
115 N. E. 286 (1917); Bouchard v. First People's Trust, 253 Mass. 351,
148 N. E. 895 (1925); Shoe & Leather Nat'l Bank v. Di:, 123 Mass. 148
(1877); Greco v. Hubbard, 252 Mass. 37, 147 N. E. 272 (1925).
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20 Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, supra note 1. See Kramer v. Cummings,
225 Ill. App. 26 (1922); Austin v. Parker, 317 Ill. 348, 148 N. E. 19
(1925); Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N. E. 246 (1893).
Betts v. Hackathorn, supra note 10. Creditor's suit. There was no provision
for meetings. The trustees were to elect their successors and to "have the
sole legal title .. .and . . . shall have and exercise the exclusive manage-
ment and control of same, in any manner they see fit . . . as absolute
owners." Held: a trust
Darling v. Buddy, supra, note 10. The trustees were to fill their own
vacancies and to "have sole direction, management and conduct" of the
enterprise. The duration was up to the trustees also. A judgment in
Iowa had been obtained against some of the shareholders upon a note made
by the organization through its trustees. Those shareholders now sue
other shareholders in Missouri for contribution. Held: a trust and no
contribution.
Marchulonis v. Adams, supra, note 10. Tort action. The shareholders wore
to meet annually and elect trustees. Also two-thirds of the shareholders
might alter, amend or terminate the agreement at any time. Held: a
partnership. For an article on the local status of these organizations see
Riley, Business Trusts and Their Relation to West Virginia Law (1922)
28 W. VA. L. Q. 287.
Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Copeland, 39 R. I. 193, 98 Atl. 273 (1916).
An executor under a will who held non-voting preferred shares asked the
court's advice as to whether he might be responsible to creditors. As far
as the common shares were concerned there was a provision for meetings
to consider reports and appoint new trustees. Two-thirds of the share-
holders might terminate the agreement at any time, or two-thirds alter
or amend with consent of the trustees, except in certain particulars. The
majority might remove and appoint new trustees. Held: a trust, and the
executor would not be responsible to creditors. It must be borne in mind
that the opinion is largely dictum inasmuch as the legal consequences of
the common shares were not before the court. For a discussion of this
case see Magruder, Shareholders in Business Trusts (1923) 23 COL. L. REV.
423, 439.
Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 10. Suit by the company.
There were provisions for annual meetings at which the trustees were
to be elected. Two-thirds of the shareholders might amend or terminate
the agreement. The shareholders also could restrict the trustees in issu-
ing shares to acquire property. Held: a partnership. See General Amer.
Oil Co. v. Waggoner Oil & Gas Co., 118 Okla. 183, 247 Pac. 99 (1925).
Following the lead set by Massachusetts, Oklahoma has adopted a statute.
By it, these trusts may not exceed twenty-one years duration, and the
creditor must look solely to the trust property. Apparently there has been
an attempt to codify the case law of Massachusetts to some extent, and
the statute would seem to apply to trusts only. Okla. Laws (1919) 30;
Okla. Comp. Stat. (1921) c. 77, 8465-8468. For a probable interpreta-
tion of this statute, see Snyder, Business and Trusts in Oklahoma (1920)
REPORT OF OKLA. STATE BAR ASS'N 153, parts of which are quoted in
SEARS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 411, et seq. It is interesting to noto,
that there are practically no cases in Oklahoma on the subject, while Texas,
adjoining, leads the field at present in the number of litigations.
Simson v. Klipstein, 88 N. J. Eq. 229, 102 Atl. 242 (1917). The question
arose upon an interpretation of "the real party in interest." The organiza-
tion was held to be a partnership in Simson v. Klipstein, 262 Fed 823
(D. N. J. 1920). There was a provision for calling meetings, and the
shareholders could amend except in three particulars. For a case where
1110
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case law of Massachusetts, this organization will be termed
either a partnership or a trust.: The technique used in reach-
ing this decision is to read 31 the terms of the written instrument
or declaration of trust; if the shareholders are "associated" and
have reserved "control" over the trustees in the management
of the trust property, then the organization is said to be a part-
nership.3 2 If they are not "associated" and have not reserved
this "control," the courts call the organization a thust.5 In
Williams v. Milto'1 ., 4 the leading and most cited American case
on this subject, Loring, J. has set forth the test for determining
the nature of these organizations:
"The difference between [cases which have been held to be
partnerships] on the one hand, and [case held to be a trust]
on the other . . lies in the fact that in the former cases
the certificate holders are associated together by the terms of
the "trust" and are the principals whose instructions are to be
obeyed by their agent who for their convenience holds the legal
title to the property. The property is their propertyv, they are
the masters; while [in the latter case] . . . the-e is no
assbciation between the certificate holders, the property is the
property of the trustees and the trustees are the masters. All
that the certificate holders . . had was a right to have
the property managed by the trustees for their benefit. They
had no right to manage it themselves nor to instruct the t'ustees
how to manage it for them."
Thus the court says that "control" and "association" are the
important elements. Apparently these courts accept this test
as universalJy valid, and use it regardless of the purpose 3 for
the trustee, was a special partner in a limited partnership, see Crehan
v. Megarel, 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296 (1922); Comment (1922) 8 Conti.
L. Q. 90.
3o No attempt will be made in this paper to deal with the term "associa-
tion." Its construction is often important, however, in connection with
tax statutes. See on this point WRIGHTINGTON, op. cit. s upra note 8, § 16:
"Associations under Federal Statutes."
- In Betts v. Hackathorn, supra note 10, at 627, 252 S. W. at 604, the
court said: "The question as to whether a partnership or strict trust is
created . . . must depend on the language and provisions of the instru-
ment involved in each case."
3
2 Supra notes 28, 29.
23 Ibid.
34 Supra note 22, at 8, 102 N. E. at 357.
35 An example of the way the courts cross-cite their authorities is found
in Williams v. Milton, supra note 22, a taxation case, where the organiza-
tion was held a trust. Of seven American cases directly cited as authority
for determining the nature of the organization before the court, four had
been held to be partnerships for the purpose of taxation; two partnerships
where one partner sued another for contribution; and the other, where a
creditor was suing, and in which the organization was held a trust. Two
English cases were also cited; one in which the trust was to be operated
for the benefit of creditors, and the matter involved in the other was
1111
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which the suit is brought. Once the court has reached the con-
clusion, by means of the above test,30 that the "true nature" of
the organization is that of partnership or trust, it will then pro-
ceed to "apply the well established principles of the law" of
trusts or partnership.37
In determining what powers reserved to the shareholders"
will amount to "control," 39 the courts will usually have to deal
with some or all of the following provisions: 40 (1) to terminate
the organization; (2) to amend or alter the agreement; (3) to
remove trustees and appoint new ones; (4) to elect trustees
annually, or to fill vacancies. Usually several of these provisions
occur together, and since it is rare that only one of them will
be found in the instrument,41 it is impossible to attempt any
quantitative analysis in an effort to predict which one will ipso
facto induce the courts to decide that there is or is not "control."
whether an investment enterprise came within the Companies Act of 1862
(25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, § 4). Apparently if the organization is called a trust
when the matter involved is taxation, the court will also call it a trust when
a creditor sues, etc. Nor do the courts seem to consider the size of the
organization, i. e., number of shareholders or the nature of the venture.
30 "Control" and "association."
37 Supra note 26. Dean Hildebrand, The Massachusetts Trust (1923) 1
TEx. L. REv. 127, 152, says, however: ". . . the courts should not feel
compelled to apply every rule of private or ordinary trust to the Massa-
chusetts trust." For a case involving the consideration of public policyj
see Williams v. Johnson, supra note 28.
38 These powers reserved must normally be exercised by a stipulated
majority.
39 By hypothesis, if the shareholders reserve in so many words the power
to direct or control the trustees the court will call it a partnership.
40 Some of the declarations which have been held partnerships or trusts
will be seen in notes 28 and 29 supra.
41 The technique of these courts apparently is to read the declaration
and determine whether it contains certain provisions which will induce
them to declare that there is "control." If there is, then they will pro-
nounce the organization to be a partnership. With all due respect to
written instruments, we assume, without deciding, that if "control" is or
should be a test, it would be sounder to examine whether there is
"control." Otherwise the test becomes a mere rule of thumb, practically,
where the shareholders are also trustees or where the trustees are amen-
able to suggestion or actually controlled by indirect means not shown on
the face of the instrument. There seems to be too much virtue in the
bare words of the instrument. For example: A, B & C might make A's
brother, D, a trustee, the instrument on its face reserving no "control"
whatsoever to the shareholders, but as a matter of fact, D might act only
upon the advice of A, B & C. The court would, without doubt, call the
organization a trust, and certain legal relations would follow. But assume
that the instrument had reserved "control," but that due to D's exceptional
ability A, B, and C had left the entire management to him. This organiza-
tion would be called a partnership, with totally different legal relations
from the organization above, merely because certain words were contained
in the instrument. Perhaps such a technique might be questioned.
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The writers on the subject have reached various conclusions ' 2
as to what weight should be given to these different provisions,
but any generalization based on the cases decided in Massa-
chusetts and concurring states 43 would probably be not only
dangerous but also useless. Nevertheless, when the instrument
has once been found to provide for "control" this element alone
is sufficient to induce the courts to call the organization a part-
nership, regardless of whether such "control" has ever been
exercised."4
It is also impossible to determine what weight the courts
will give to the matter of "association," 41 i. c., a provision for
meetings of shareholders, but since there would be little purpose
or harm in meetings where there was no "control" to be ex-
ercised, such a provision alone would probably be of little
weight. 1 It would appear almost absurd to provide for "as-
sociation" without "control" except for the possible purpose of
42Dean Hildebrand favors what might be called a very strict construc-
tion of the instrument. In his article, op. cit. supra note 37, at 149, be
says: 'f by the declaration of trust the shareholders reserve the actual
or potential power, as a practical matter, to control the trustees in con-
ducting the business of the organization, it is a partnership."
Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts (1923) 23
COL. L. R;v. 423, 443 favors going the limit in the other direction on the
grounds that no one or "any combination of these powers should be held
to turn the trust into a partnership contrary to the intent of the parties,"
where the "management is exclusively vested in the trustees."
Mr. Wrightington, op. cit. supra note 8 at 66, et scq. says that with
the possible exception of the power to remove the trustees at will, none of
the other, provisions should render the organization a partnership. Ho
adds, however, ". . . that as a practical matter the power to elect the
trustees at stated intervals . . . gives real control of the conduct of
the enterprise," but not technical control.
Rowley, The Influence of Control in the Dcternination of Partnership
Liability (1928) 26 MIcH. L. REV. 290, has queried as to how much "nega-
tive control," i. e., where the consent of the shareholders is required for
certain acts by the trustees, will the courts permit before it becomes con-
trol in the accepted sense.
Mr. Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 766 says: "Any case which holds
that an organization that does carry on an active business is a trustee-
ship and shareholders are not liable for debts when such shareholders do
not control, is wrong in principle."
43 Supra. note 29.
"4There is a strenuous dictum to this effect in Simpson v. Klipstein,
supra note 29, at 825.
1 In Frost v. Thompson, supra note 28, decided one year after Wil-
liams v. Milton, &upra note 22, Rugg, C. J. madq no mention of "asso-
ciation," but spoke only of "control." See on this particular point Wright-
ington op. cit. supra note 8 at 47. No cases on the direct point were found.
Dean Hildebrand, op. cit. supra note 37, at 139. To the same effect
see also Magruder, op. cit. supra note 42, at 431. But see WRIGHTINGTON,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 46: '"t would seem that the element of associa-
tion is essential to a partnership."
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receiving dividends and hearing reports.47  On the other hand,
however, the courts will doubtless not hesitate to call the organi-
zation a partnership where this control is reserved individually
although there is no mention of meetings. 48
It will be remembered that the reason for the development of
this organization in Massachusetts was the general inability of
corporations to hold or deal in land.49  It was developed in a
conservative community and was used mainly in conservative
enterprises.,' Its many advantages were not to be overlooked
when the fever of the oil industry spread over Texas. The or-
ganization, with its touted limited responsibility, apparently
proved itself 'ill-suited (or too well suited) to such speculative
enterprises. The opportunity of avoiding personal responsibility
evidently did not increase the prudence or good judgment of the
trustees in incurring obligations, for the fulfillment of which
creditors were to be restricted to certain trust property that
might become worthless over night. When the matter came be-
fore the supreme court of Texas for the first time, that body
lost no time in striking a blow for the creditor. In the leading
case in that state on the subject,51 it was held that the organiza-
47 It is granted that control and association usually appear together,
but the latter is merely a' means of exerting the former. To say that
it is an essential element seems analogous to the saying that ownership
or the use of a pen is a part of the crime of forgery.
48 Magruder, op. cit. supra note 42, at 431.
-9 Supra note 13.
50 Supra. notes 13-15. See also Hildebrand, Liability of Trustees, Prop-
erty and Shareholders of a Massachusets Trust (1924) 2 Tx. L. RaV.
139, 167.
51 Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554 (1925). The trust
instrument expressly granted to the trustees complete power and authority
to do business, buy and sell, etc. The shareholders reserved only the
privilege of inspecting the books, receiving dividends, and by four-fifths
majority, consenting to a termination by the trustees. There was also
the usual stipulation that creditors must look solely to the trust property,
and that the trustees had no power to bind the shareholders. It was agreed
in the trial that "neither the plaintiff nor defendant had any knowledge
that the trustees were acting under any other power except the original
declaration of trust and complying with its terms."
See also Victor Refining Co. v. City National Bank, 115 Tex. 71, 274
S. W. 561 (1925). Creditor sued shareholder as partner. The declara-
tion of trust provided that the management of affairs be in the hands
of a board of trustees, elected annually by shareholders and that such
trustees should have general control of the business of the company, with
the power to appoint managers, agents, etc. There was the further cus-
tomary stipulation that the trustees had no power to bind the share-
holders personally, that the contract entered into must refer to the declara-
tion of trust, and that the person so contracting should "look only to the
pioperty . . . of the company . . . for payment of any debt," and that
the shareholders should in no instance be personally responsible. In the
correspondence which led up to the contract, all the letterheads of the
1114
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tion was a partnership and that a creditor might recover against
a shareholder as a partner, although the organization would
have been a trust 2 by the Massachusetts test. Although the
opinion does considerable violence *3 to many accepted concepts,
it is fairly clear that the court had determined what its attitude
toward the responsibility of shareholders in a "Massachusetts
Trust" to creditors of the organization would be long before
there was any occasion to write an opinion on the matter2.5 '
And merely by way of emphasis the court added that -, it had
"neither time nor inclination to further consider the abstract
4uestion of what might or might not be the rule for the decision
of the case in a sister state." It is submitted, however, that
the decision must be strictly confined to its facts (actions by
company had contained the following: ". . . the articles . . . vest control
* . . in trustees, . . . under a declaration of trust, recorded in deed
records of Wichita Co., Texas, reference to which is here made, which
provide that . . . assets be charged . . . which exempts . . . the share-
holders for liability for same . . ." The court held the defendant re-
sponsible as a partner. Accord: Chapman v. Witt, 285 S. W. 331 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926). Compare cases decided at the same time as Victor Re-
fining Co. v. City National Bank, supra: Hollister v. McCamey, 115 Tex.
49, 274 S. W. 562 (1925), lower court decision 241 S. W. 689 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922) noted in (1923) 32 YALE LAW JotNAL 83; Howe v. Keystone
Pipe and Supply Co., 115 Tex. 158, 274 S. W. 563 (1925) rehearing denied
278 S. W. 177 (1925), See Comment (1927) 12 ConN. L. Q. 198 on
Thompson v. Schmitt, supra.
52 Hildebrand, Massachusetts Trust-A Sequel (1925) 4 Tmx. L. Rsv.
57. In his article Dean Hildebrand criticizes the court severely and points
out how it has ridden rough-shod over numerous precedents. In his article,
Hildebrand, op. cit. supra note 50, at 165 et seq., he indicates how pro
'tata responsibility should be put on the shareholders, and the creditor given
relief on the theory of subrogating him to the trustee's right of indemnity
3n the principle of Hardoon v. Belilios [1901] A. C. 118.
Z3The grounds for the decision in Thompson v. Schmitt, mipra note 51,
,'ere: (1) The trustees were "chosen agents" to conduct the businezs and
that "all authority they possessed was delegated to them by the share-
holders . . 2 (2) Profit sharing is a test of partnership. (U) The
statutes 'prohibit any limitation of partnership liability to creditors in
the manner shown" because such is the implication from the statutes pro-
viding for corporations and limited partnerships. Te this last ground,
Dean Hildebrand, after an historical review of the legislation, comments,
"It might as well be argued that in Texas all children born in lawful
wedlock are illegitimate because the Legislature of Texas passed a statute
permitting the adoption of an heir." Hildebrand, op. cit. mpra note 52, at
63.
z' Although the instant case was one in which the organization was en-
gaged in a mail order business, practically all of the recent cases from
Texas have been those in which the organization was used in an oil venture.
There seems little doubt but that the court realized what such a com-
mercial device in the oil business would lead to and that it was con-
cerned more with protecting the public, particularly creditors, than it was
with rendering an opinion unassailable from a legalistic point of view.
55 Thompson v. Schmitt, supra note 51 at 67, 274 S. W. at 559.
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creditors). This has already been shown,50 and there are strong
indications that this holding is fast being whittled away inas-
much as the courts now seem eager to find some, or any, agree-
ment whereby the creditor has expressed his willingness not to
look to the shareholders personally." The recent decisions show
a tendency to depart from any hard and fast rule, and evince
an inclination to reach a satisfactory result on a particular set
of facts.
A result approaching that reached in Texas is seen in
Florida,58 and also in Indiana, 9 where the organizations have
56 Culp v. Robey, 299 S. W. 846 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). The defend-
ant, while a trustee, vested with complete legal title and having exclusive
and active management, misappropriated funds of the organization. He
was subsequently declared a bankrupt. This action was predicated upon
Bankruptcy Act, § 17 (4), U. S. C. A. § 35 providing that a debt created
by "fraud . . . while acting as an officer or in a fiduciary capacity"
shall not be discharged by bankruptcy. Nichols, J., speaking for the court
said, "In so far as Thompson v. Schmitt attributes the character of a
partnership, it is so in respect to liabilities, etc. to outside parties ....
Since that action [the appointment of the defendant trustee in the instant
case] is moved by confidence . . . it demonstrates a fiduciary nature . . ."
It is submitted that the same result would have been reached in Massa-
chusetts with a trust. This case might suggest that whether you call the
organization a trust or partnership, it is still possible for the court to got
the same result.
5s Shelton v. Montoya Oil & Gas Co., 272 S. W. 222 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925), aff'd 292 S. W. 165 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). The plaintiff sued
the shareholders, who were also trustees, on a note. The plaintiff knew
of the trust agreement [which is not set forth] and the provision against
personal responsibility of shareholders. To the note were attached cer-
tificates of shares in the company, to which the plaintiff had agreed orally
to look for payment. Held, the defendants were not responsible personally
because of the agreement at the time the notes werel taken. See also
Farmers' State Bank & Trust Co. v. Gorman Home Refinery, 273 S. W.
694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), aff'd 3 S. W. (2d) 65 (Tex. Comm. App.
1928). Oral statements of the cashier of the plaintiff bank that individual
shareholders would not be responsible defeated an action by the bank
against the sharehblder. No authority was cited. Clearly the harshness
of Thompson v. Schmitt is being mitigated and rather questionable con-
tracts against the shareholder's responsibility are being sanctioned.
58 Willey v. Hoggson Corp., 90 Fla. 343, 106 So. 408 (1925). Declaration
of trust not set out. The complaint was filed in the name of the organiza-
tion, which the court said "was nothing but a veiled and futile effort to
avoid the liabilities of a copartnership, and acquire the privileges and
immunities of a corporation without complying with the corporation laws
Such . . . is nothing more than a copartnership," and held that
when an "action is brought in behalf of such an association, it must be
brought in the names of all the members as copartners." A dictum adds
that such members are "jointly and severally liable."
59 McClaren v. Dawes Electric Sign Co., 156 N. E. 584 (Ind. App. 1927).
Creditor sued defendants, all of whom were both trustees and shareholders,
except one who was only a shareholder. Judgment was against the de-
fendants as partners except the one who was not a trustee. The lower
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been held to be "partnerships", in the only two cases found.
The reasoning in the opinions is a bit obscuri and the courts
apparently have adopted the technique of the Vermont justice
of the peace, who, when confronted with a case involving the
possession of a churn, looked through the statute index, and fail-
ing to find the word "churn," promptly dismissed the action.
Louisiana - may be classed with those states which call the
organization a "partnership," but the reasoning therefor seems
correct under the civil law to which the institution of trusts
was a stranger.- Consequently a trust can only be formed
as provided by statute.
62
There is another group of states in which these organizations
are called "corporations," although by the Massachusetts test
they might be "trusts." The decisions are based upon a con-
struction of the constitutional definition of a corporation. These
provisions are very common. They are substantially similar,
and read largely as follows:
"The term corporation . . . includes all associations and
joint stock companies having any powers or privileges not pos-
sessed by individuals or partnerships." 6
court's dismissal as to him was affirmed apparently on the grounds that
the defendants had no reason to complain if the plaintiff did not. The
court said that it was unnecessary to decide whether the organization
was a trust or a partnership because "there is vo law in this statc, statu-
tory or, otherwise [italics ours] authorizing or recognizing the right to
organize an association . . . under a declaration of trust and thus
evade the statutes concerning . . . corporations or through which the
shareholders can escape their liabilities as partners." Ibid. 585. The court
disregarded the Massachusetts cases on the ground that they were "recog-
nized by the statutes of that state and their organization authorized." Cf.
Elliott v. Freeman, 220 U. S. 178, 31 Sup. Ct. 360 (1911).
It is impossible to say how Kentucky regards these organizations. See
Ing v. Liberty National Bank, 216 Ky. 467, 287 S. W. 960 (1926). See
a local prediction as to these organizations, Dawson, Massachusett3 Trsts
(1922) Ky. STATE BAR ASS'N 45.
60 Amer. Nat. Bank v. Reclamation Oil Producing Ass'n; 156 La. 652,
658, 101 So. 10, 11 (1924). The court said, "There is no law in this
state which authorizes the association of parties under the management
of trustees, to issue certificates of participation . . . and to engage in
* * ' business enterprises. . . . It [the trust agreement] merely created
an unincorporated private association which is precisely on the same foot-
ing as to the liabilities of its members as other partnerships."
61arks v. Loewenberg, 143 La. 196, 78 So. 444 (1916).
62 See La. Ann. Rev. Stat. (Marr. 1926) 1696-1704.
63 Wash. Const., art. 12, § 5. Substantially similar provisions are to
be found: Ala. Const., art. 12, § 241; Cal. Const., art. 12, § 9; Kan. Const.,
art. 12, § 6; La. Const., art. 268; Mich. Const., art. 15, § 11; Binn. Const.,
art. 10, § 1; Miss. Const., art. 7, § 199; Mo. Const., art. 12, § 11; Mont.
Const., art. 15, § 18; N. C. Const., art. 8, § 3; N. D. Coast., art. 7, §
144; N. Y. Const., art. 8, § 3; Pa. Coast., art. 16, § 13; S. C. Const., art.
9, § 1; S. D. Const., art. 17, § 19; Va. Const., art. 12, § 153.
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These cases usually come up in connection with the Blue Sky
Laws r- No one will deny that these organizations should all
be supervised in the matter of selling their shares, 9 regardless
of what they are called. But the Washington 6 court recognized
the possibilities of such logic,6 7 and has permitted quo warrrnto
to be brought against the trustees for purporting to exercise
corporate powers without complying with the statutory require-
ments. The Kansas court likewise did not fail to appreciate
the possibilities, and has held the shareholder to partnership
responsibility to creditors on the theory of an improperly formed
corporation6 8 In these cases the court calls the organization
a corporation by definition and then inconsistently says, in effect,
that it is not a corporation and therefore since a corporation
was not formed aceording to the statute, the creditors may
hold shareholders to a partnership responsibility although they
purported to form neither a "partnership" nor a "corporation."
No thought is given apparently to the purpose ii view when the
definition of a corporation was placed in the constitutions, and
the courts seem to believe that such a definition is applicable
in all cases where the organization is concerned. 9
64 Reilly v. Cline, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925) in which the declara-
tion was said to be similar to that in Williams v. Milton, supra note 28;
State v. Hinkle, 126 Wash. 581, 219 Pac. 41 (1923); Home Lumber Co.
v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 190 Pac. 601 (1920); Comment (1921) 6 CoRN.
L. Q. 348.
05 There seems no question but that these organizations will come within
the Blue Sky Laws when they wish to sell their shares, etc. People v.
Clum, 213 Mich. 651, 182 N. W. 136 (1921); King v. Commonwealth, 197
Ky. 128, 246 S. W. 162 (1922) ; Wagner v. Kelso, 195 IoWa 959, 193 N. W.
1 (1923) ; cf. Malley v. Bowditch, 259 Fed. 809 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) ; '7 A. L.
R. 608 (1920) annotation. See also Benas, The Corporate Securities Aot
(1926) 14 CALIF. L. REV. 101, 111.
66 State v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2 (1926). It must be noted
that by the Massachusetts test, however, this organization would probably
have been held a partnership. Cf. Elson v. Tefft, 140 Wash. 568, 250 Pac.
346 (1926).
67 But see Spottswood v. Morris, 12 Idaho, 360, 85 Pac. 1094 (1900);
State v. Cosgrave, 36 Idaho 278, 210 Pac. 393 (1922).
68 Weber Engine Co. v. Alter, 120 Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143 (1926). By
the Massachusetts test, a trust would have been created. See the spe-
cially concurring opinion, page 564, 245 Pac. at 148, in which Marshall, J.
favors the result but puts his decision on the ground that the organization
was similar to a limited partnership, without complying with the statute, and
consequently a general partnership was the result. In accord with the instant
case see: Weber Engine Co. v. Barley, 123 Kan. 665, 256 Pac. 803 (1927);
Linn v. Houston, 123 Kan. 409, 255 Pac. 1105 (1927). Contra: Darling v.
Buddy, supra note 10, in which it is to be noted that Missouri has a con-
stitutional provision supra note 63, similar to that in Kansas. The court,
however, did not cite Weber Engine Co. v. Alter. Cf. Home Lumber Co.
v. Hopkins, supra note 64.
69 On this point see (1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 198.
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Speaking generally, in one group of states this organization
will be called a partnership or trust, depending upon the face
of the instrument. In another group,"' regardless of the specific
terms, it will be called a partnership. In still another, it will
be called a corporation. Apparently the courts are working on
the hypothesis that there are three distinct categories,-- each
capable of complete definition; that there is some way to deter-
mine the true nature of this organization and once having done
this, i. e., selected the category, that there is a known set of legal
relations which are inseparable from that category. -2  Such a
technique seems unsound and hinders the courts from approach-
ing the problem in a more rational way. This organization is
similar to a trust, a partnership, and a corporation, its similarity
to any particular one varying according to the terms of the in-
strument. As Mr. Wrightington says, 3 "The very difficulty of
securely placing these organizations in the domain of either
partnership or trust suggests that they may belong in neither."
Would it not be better to regard this organization as a new
device, one sui generis, and then proceed to determine its legal
relations upon the factual construction, the purpose of its crea-
tion, and its utility in society? When the legal relations are
thus determined with a particular end in view, then a name
might be resorted to as a means of describing those legal re-
lations; the name selected would not, however, be the reason
for the decision.74 To illustrate, the same organization (even
assuming it to be a trust) might be called a trust when taxation
was the problem; a corporation when the Blue Sky Law was
invoked; and a partnership when the creditor was suing. It is
conceded that to determine the legal relations from the point
of utility will require the courts to consider various data, and
there would, of course, be some difficulty, but this seems only to
present a choice between a blind, but simple rule of thumb, and
a practical, though difficult approach. So far, many courts have
failed to consider the fact that this type of organization might
be useful when restricted to small groups but not so when the
shareholders number perhaps a thousand.5 Nor do they seem
70 The qualification must be made that a recent Te.'as case, supra note
56, indicates that the courts of that state will not, however, press the
term "partnership" to an unjust conclusion.
-' See quotation from Ricker v. Amer. Loan & Trust Company, supra
note 26 for a reference to categories.
7 2 Supra note 23.
73 WRIGHTINGTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 69.
.4 Supra note 23. Such a word would describe the legal relations of the
organization as to the particular point involved, as well as similar pointa
in like fact transactions.
- In the Wachusett Realty Trust, Crocker v. Malley, 250 Fed. 817, 818
(C. C. A. 1st, 1918) there were 3 shareholders, 5 of whom were trustee3.
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to consider that it might be fitted for the development of real
estate, where the creditor will have reliable security, but not to
speculation where the trust property may vanish over night.-e A
procedure which fails to take these various elements into account
would appear questionable.
When this organization, assuming it would be a "trust," by
the Massachusetts doctrine, is considered by a court in which
the matter has not been settled, it seems obvious that the court
will be able to decide each particular issue in any one of several
ways, depending upon which of the three competing analogies
it selects as a starting point. The present diversity of result
might justify a court's inquiry even beyond the existing case
law. In reaching a conclusion, should the court not adopt a
more pragmatic attitude? Would it not even be pertinent to
inquire as to the meaning of "control," and if there is anything
"in the nature of things" to compel the court to make share-
holders pay if this "control" is reserved, but protect them if it
is not? Might the court not also consider the number of mem-
bers and the kind of enterprise? Such an attitude, it is sub-
In Thompson v. Schmitt, supra note 51, there were to be 1,000,000 shares,
and in Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Gorman Home Refinery, supra note
57, the shareholders were "in the neighborhood of 1,000."
76 Generally the writers on this subject have not considered the creditor's
interest to any extent. For instance, Prof. Magruder says that the creditor
of a trust has the trustees' personal responsibility as protection and if this
is insufficient, the creditor is to blame. And if the trustees contract away
their responsibility such "again is a matter of contract between the creditor
and the trustees and furnishes no reason for imposing liability on the
shareholders." Magruder, op. cit. supra note 42, at 428. Of course the
creditor might still look to the trust property if it were of any value. But
might it not be argued that limited responsibility is a precious asset, and
if the shareholders do not choose to incorporate or form a limited partner-
ship, it is not asking too much that they, by their trustees, be the ones to
make the special contract?
Even assuming all shareholders personally responsible, if the organization
were prudently conducted for real estate development, investment, or some
conservative enterprise, would not the shareholders receive sufficient pro-
tection with this property as a buffer and the creditor's first resort? If
not, then might not the creditor tell the shareholder to take some other
means of limiting his responsibility, e. g., incorporation? Such a view
would certainly eliminate speculative schemes.
The shareholder responsibility might be either that of a partner, or only
pro rata, as suggested by Dean Hildebrand. Hildebrand, op. cit. supra
note 50, at 165 et seq.
It might be interesting to note that out of 26 Massachusetts cases, 15
were partnerships, 6 trusts, and in 5 the issue was not definitely decided.
This might suggest that.the limited responsibilty of the shareholder in
a trust was not the sole reason for the organization. On the other
hand, since the decision of Thompson v. Schmitt, supra note 51 there have
been practically no new organizations in Texas. Supra note 19. This
data on its face might suggest a difference between the two jurisdictions.
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mitted, would be sounder than deciding that certain characteris-
tics of the organization resemble those of an e:xisting category
and, therefore, that all of the legal relations usually associated
with that category must of necessity exist."7
CONSTRUCTION OF STATE STATUTES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The federal courts appear to regard their general deference
to the state courts as the ultimate authority in the construction
of state statutes more as a matter of comity and sound policy
than of obligation. Where the federal courts, in cases coming
before them because of the diverse citizenship of the parties
or because of rights claimed under the federal Constitution,
have been called upon to construe a state statute in the first
instance, they have consistently followed a prior construction
by the state CoUrt. 2  Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the absence of previous adjudication on its part, has
adhered to the state construction, regardless of its own opinion
on the merits, in cases coming to it from state courts, and then
determined whether this construction denied any federal right
claimed below.3 Where several states have statutes identical
in terms, but construe them differently, the federal courts have
followed each construction as though it were written into the
statute.4 Similarly the Supreme Court has followed a state con-
7 This article is directed largely at the courts' reasoning used in the
opinions. In many of the cases the decisions will in fact be based on
economic and other fundamental grounds, but the opinions do not clearly set
them out. A plea might be made that the courts be a little more straight-
forward in announcing the causes which have motivated their decisions in
particular cases.
11 Stat. 92 (1789), U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 153S, 23 U. S. C. A.
(1928) § 725 provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in
the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." For a com-
prehensive discussion, see DOBME, FEDERAL JuRISBicTiOx *xD PrIoccDVE
(1928) § 140.
2 Tioga R. R. v. Blossburg & Corning R. R., 20 Wall. 137 (U. S. 1S73);
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. CL 50 (1890);
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 43 Sup. Ct. 303 (1923). "No case yet
has gone to the length of undertaking to correct the construction of State
laws by State courts." Holmes, J., in Jones v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 273
U. S. 195, 199, 47 Sup. Ct. 338, 339 (1927).
3 Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 146 U. S. 162, 13 Sup. Ct. 54 (1892);
Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U. S. 1, 24 Sup. Ct. 748 (1904); Quong Ham
Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 255 U. S. 445, 41 Sup. Ct. 373
(1921); Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U. S. 148, 40
Sup. Ct. 59 (1925); Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm., 271 U. S. 583,
46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926).
4 Cristy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196 (U. S. 186); see Louisiana v. Pis-
bury, 105 U. S. 278, 294 (1881). Compare Chicago Union Bank v. Kansas
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struction thougha federal court elsewhere has construed a similar
statute differently.' But only constructions by the state court
of last resort, in cases squarely presenting the issue, and on
which there is no conflict in the state decisions, are controlling.0
Where these conditions do not exist, or where the state court
has not yet construed the statute, the federal courts have exer-
cised an independent judgment, which has not been disturbed
on appeal to the Supreme Court because of a contrary state
decision rendered while the appeal was pending.,
Once having arrived at a construction, either before construc-
tion by the state courts or by following a prior state construct-
ion, the federal courts do not feel bound to accept a contrary
interpretation or a change in construction by a state court, but,
exercising an independent judgment, they have generally done
so.9 Refusal to do so has been based on the ground that the
new construction was not well settled.10 Where property rights
have been acquired on the faith of a construction of a state
statute by a state court which is subsequently reversed, the Su-
preme Court, in cases reaching it from the lower federal courts,
has protected these rights by adhering to the earlier construc-
tion." Furthermore, where there is no construction before
rights are acquired, but the statute is later held by the state
court to be invalid under the state constitution, the Supreme
Court has allowed lower federal courts to pass independently on
the question and sustain the statute with respect to such rights."
In a case coming from a state court, however, the Supreme
Court is limited to the federal questions raised below, and will
not take jurisdiction with a view to challenging the reversal of
a state construction after property rights have accrued, 13 unless
City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 10 Sup. Ct. 1013 (1890), and M'ay v. Tenney,
148 U. S. 60, 13 Sup. Ct. 491 (1893), with White v. Cotzhauzen, 129 U. S.
329, 9 Sup. Ct. 309 (1889).
5 Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30, 44 Sup. Ct. 432 (1924).
6 See Comments (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 855, 856, n. 10; (1927)
40 HARv. L. REV. 310, 311; (1927) 5 TEx. L. REV. 191, 195.
7 Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368, 35 Sup. Ct. 932 (1915); Risty v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 270 U. S. 378, 46 Sup. Ct. 236 (1926).
8 Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. 10 (1883). Contra: People
of Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 48 Sup. Ct. 239 (U. S. 1928).
9 Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291 (U. S. 1832) ; Roberts v. Lewis, 153
U. S. 367, 14 Sup. Ct. 945 (1894); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees
v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458, 45 Sup. Ct. 543 (1925); Chicago, M. St. P. & P.
Ry. v. Risty, 48 Sup. Ct. 396 (U. S. 1928) ; see Supervisors v. United States,
18 Wall. 71, 82 (U. S. 1873) ; Roberts v. Bolles, 101 U. S. 119, 128 (1879).
10 See Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595, 598 (U. S. 1855).
I" Gelpeke v. Dubuque, I Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863); cf. Rowan v. Runnels,
5 How. 134 (U. S. 1847); Morgan v. Curtenius, 20 How. 1 (U. S. 1857).
3 Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 24 Sup. Ct.
576 (1904).
23 Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. 80 (1895); of.
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. v. Milwaukee, 252 U. S. 100, 40 Sup. Ct. 306 (1920).
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the result of the reversal can be found to give effect to a subse-
quent state statute which impairs the obligation of contracts."
Federal courts have expressed great reluctance to construe
state statutes in the absence of a construction by the state courL25
In diverse citizenship cases, however, a decision on their part is
imperative. Cases reaching the Supreme Court from the state
courts usually contain a construction of the state statute upon
which the federal question, which must have been raised below,
turns. Failure to obtain a construction upon a particular point
below has been regarded as failure to raise the federal question
turning upon it there, although the appellant had made a gen-
eral claim of a constitutional guarantee, as the protection of
the due process clause, in the state court.", Under these cir-
cumstances, the Supreme Court, by declining jurisdiction,
avoided anticipating construction by the state court. Where,
however, new state legislation has been enacted after the appeal
to the Supreme Court has been taken, the Court holds that it
has power to construe the state law under the new conditions,
but in a recent case has found it more appropriate to remand
the question of construction to the state court.27 Similarly,
14 McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 19 Sup. Ct. 134 (1898);
Columbia Ry. Gas & Electric Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 23G, 43 Sup.
Ct. 306 (1923).
25 See Michigan Central R. R. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245, 291, 2G Sup.
Ct. 459, 461 (1905).
2c Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212, 26 Sup. Ct. 31 (1905). So where a
party has made only one of several possible claims under the due process
clause below, such claims being susceptible of independent solution, the
Supreme Court has refused to listen to another on appeal. Thus in a
special assessment case the Court declined to consider the question of
benefits when the defendant had only contested in the highest state court
the imposition of personal responsibility for a deficiency. Dewey v. Des
Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 19 Sup. Ct. 379 (1899). So where only proceeding
by information for a felony was questioned below, trial of an issue by tho
judge without a jury was not considered in the Supreme Court. Bolln v
Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, 20 Sup. Ct. 287 (1900). And where only the val-
idity of a criminal syndicalism act was challenged below, the Court refused
to review the rulings of the trial court on the pleadings and evidence.
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927). But a
majority of the Court found that a discussion below of whether a railroad
did business within a state and hence could be taxed there was sufficient to
permit the raising of the question of the method of assessing the tax on
appeal. Southern Ry. v. Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76, 47 Sup. CL 542 (1927).
Similarly, where only one federal right, as protection under the contract
clause, has been relied on below, a party may not claim another, as the
protection of the due process clause, in the Supreme Court. Hunter v.
Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 40 (1907); Keokuk & Hamilton
Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626, 20 Sup. Ct. 205 (1900); Cox v. Texas,
202 U. S. 446, 26 Sup. Ct. 671 (1906); Montana v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291,
27 Sup. Ct. 281 (1907).
27 Missouri ex rel Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Comm., 273 U. S. 126,
47 Sup. Ct. 311 (1927); (1927) 40 HARV. L. REV. 903.
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where the question before the Court was narrowed to that of the
severability of a state statute because of another decision while
the appeal was pending, and where such question had not been
considered below, the Court found it appropriate to refer the
matter back to the state court.
18
But in the recent case of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 48 Sup. Ct. 259
(U. S. 1928), the Supreme Court departed from this general
tendency to accept state constructions and not to anticipate them,
apparently for the very purpose of foreclosing state action. The
suit, arose from a collision between the automobile of the de-
fendant, a resident of Pennsylvania, and the plaintiff's wagon,
on a highway in New Jersey. In an action brought by the plain-
tiff in New Jersey, process for the defendant was left with the
secretary of state under the provisions of a New Jersey statute
declaring that non-resident motorists, by availing themselves of
the privilege extended by the state of operating within the
state without a New Jersey registration or license, constituted
the secretary of state their agent for the acceptance of process
in any civil suit brought against them by any resident of the
state, for any accident arising out of such operation. Notice
of such service was mailed by the secretary of state to the de-
fendant. The latter's contention in the highest state court that
the statute denied him due process of law in that it gave the
state courts jurisdiction over him without his having been per-
sonally served within the state, was overruled. While an ap-
peal was pending, the Supreme Court, in Hess v. Pawloski,1 sus-
tained under the police power a similar statute, which, however,
expressly required the secretary of state to mail notice of ser-
vice to the defendant. Hence the instant case, on reaching the
Court, turned on the narrow point of whether such a provision
was requisite to due process. A majority of the Court 20 held that
the New Jersey statute was void because it lacked a provision
making it reasonably probable that notice of service would be
communicated to a non-resident, and reversed the judgment.
Three Justices dissented on the ground, inter alia, that to save
the validity of the statute, the state court might well have con-
strued it to require the notification that was given, had the
point been raised below, and that, though the Supreme Court
had power to construe, the matter should be remanded to the
state court.
The Courtinthe instant case appears to have overlooked a clear
opportunity to avoid anticipating construction by the state court.
I8 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 44 Sup. Ct. 323 (1924) ; Note (1924)
37 HARv. L. Rsv. 1129.
19 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
20 The majority opinion is by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, and Stone dissenting.
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The alternative urged by the dissent would not compromise the
Court's view as to what notice was essential to due process.
Moreover, the specific objection fatal to the statute was first
raised in the Supreme Court. Failure to raise it below is not
urged as a basis for the Court's declining jurisdiction. But such
failure should not operate to deprive the plaintiff of the pos-
sibility of a favorable construction in the state court, which
would have been conclusive in the Supreme Court. The instant
decision does not preclude the New Jersey courts, in subsequent
cases, from construing the statute so as to meet the constitu-
tional objection raised in the United States Supreme Court, but
it is res adjudicata between the instant parties and may have
the result of depriving the plaintiff of all remedy.
"INTENT" IN DOMTICIL
The traditional and accepted definitions of domicil of choice
stress two essential ingredients, actual residence and intention
to make that residence a home-the factum and the anlmvs
ranendi. The American Law Institute Restatement § 20 ex-
presses the necessity of intent:
"A person cannot change his domicil by removal to a new
dwelling-place without an intention to make the new dwelling-
place his home."
This satisfies rather neatly the desire to express that elusive
element in domicil which has repeatedly forced courts to deny
the possibility of defining domicil, but upon examination, it
seems somewhat lacking in certainty. "Intention" cannot well
mean the subjective plans of the person involved. The Com-
ment on § 20 is:
"If he intends to remain there permanently, it is easier to
find that he intends to make his home there than if he intends
to move away at some time in the future. If he does not in-
tend to move at a definite time, it is easier to find that he has
made his home there than if he intends to move at a definite
time."
3 AAFmIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMnENT No. 1, §
17: "(1) A domicil of choice is a domicil acquired by a person legally
capable of changing his domicil through the exercise of his own will.
(2) To acquire a domicil of choice, a person must give up his home, if
he has one, and establish a dwelling-place with the intention of making it
his home.
(3) The fact of a dwelling-place and the intention to make it a home
must concur: if they do so, even for a moment, the change of domicil
takes place."
DicEY, THE LAW OF DoIm (1S79) 73: "Rule 7. Every independent
person can acquire a domicil of choice, by the combination of residence
(factun) and intention (animus nmnendi), but not otherwise."
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If "intention" as there used were interpreted subjectively, the
result would be much like the proverb that if you can put salt
on a bird's tail you can catch him. That this is not the meaning
of the drafters of the Restatement is indicated by § 15, Comment
2 (e) :
"The mental attitude of the person concerned towards the
dwelling-place in respect to its character and permanency is
an important factor in determining whether the place is or is not
his home, but is not conclusive." [Italics ours].
In the problem of domicil as in other legal questions, the "in-
tention" is objective, what a person's acts would indicate an
ordinary man's intention to be regardless of actual feelings of
the person, even though it were possible to discover what those
actual feelings were.
2
"Home" as distinguished from "dwelling-place" is a conception
familiar to English-speaking people. The difficulty with its use
in connection with domicil is that the difference between it and
a dwelling-place is subjective. Thus, when one has an objective
intention (i. e., acts connoting an intention) to have what can be
objectively recognized as a home, there is usually no contro-
versy as to domicil. The cases come up only where the existence
of the mental attitude is not apparent in relation to the abode,
or where it is apparent in connection with two places and the
law requires that only one be taken for the domicil. This
search for an intent to make a home 4 confuses rather than as-
sists in the solution of the problem of domicil.
A comparison of other definitions of "intent" seems futile.
They are either so narrow that the courts have to slide un-
2 Devitt, Recent Domicil Cases (1925) 20 ILL. L. Rzv. 134, 139: "'Choice'
does not mean that a person, sui juris, may pick out a place -which he
-wishes to be considered his legal home and have it become so. . . . but
that the laws give some consideration to his desires in relation to other
circumstances. A person does not choose his domicil but his activities in
such a wise that the law will consider them when determining his
legal home."
3 AMERIcAN LAW INsTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 13: "Every person
has at all times one domicil, and no person has more than one domicil at
a time."
4 Ibid. § 10: "Domicil is the place with which a person has a settled con-
nection for legal purposes; either because his home is there or because it is
assigned to him by the law."
Ibid. § 14 (2): "The fundamental conception underlying domicil is that
of home. The great majority of persons have homes; in the normal cases
a person's is his domicil."
Ibid. § 14 (3): "Not all persons have homes; every person must have a
domicil." See ibid. § 13: "Where a person has no home the law still assigns
to such person a domicil. .... Some persons have more than one home; no
person can have more than one domicil at a time . .. .
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consciously from one to another as the occasion demands,5 or so
general that the court finds the law "well settled" but practically
useless as applied to actual facts.2 The problem of what intent
means may be approached from a different angle. What do the
courts find to be the "intent" in certain typical fact situations?"
A strong subjective intent combined with an occasional resi-
dence is insufficient in itself to make a domicil. Thus, where a
person has a sentimental attachment for a former residence
which he seldom visits, but has an actual present residence in
and active affiliations with another place, his intentions are said
to be to make his domicil the latter." Where the new residence
is in a foreign country, the courts are more reluctant to find a
change of domicil,9 but they do so if the mere claim of domicil
is practically the only remaining connection.", The courts are
particularly ready to ignore the expressed intention of the per-
son when he, for an apparent ulterior motive such as the avoid-
ance of a high tax rate, chooses a mere makeshift abode while a
comfortable residence elsewhere is continued for most purposes,
- Comment (1927) 36 YALE LAW JoUNAL 408.
6 "The legal principles determining the place of residence, when it is in
dispute, are fairly well established. The difficulty arises only when it is
attempted to apply these principles to the facts of each particular case."
Baker v. Baker Eccles & Co., 162 Ky. 683, 705, 173 S. W. 109, 118 (1915).
71n this comment "home" is used only to apply to a residence which
admittedly has the attributes usually connoted by the word, and "residence"
to apply to the factum of dwelling in a place regardless of domicil. "Resi-
dence" in the statutes is often interpreted as practically synonomous with
domicil.
s Baker v. Baker Eccles & Co., supra note 6, affd 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup.
Ct. 152 (1917) (for purpose of succession) ; In re Sedgwick, 223 Fed. 655
(D. Mass. 1915) (for purpose of bankruptcy jurisdiction); In re Rooney,
172 App. Div. 274, 159 N. Y. Supp. 132 (3d Dept. 1916) (for purpose
of voting).
9 Hutchins v. Browne, 253 Mass. 55, 147 N. E. 899 (1925) (for purpose
of succession); Cruger v. Phelps, 21 Misc. 252, 47 N. Y. Supp. 61 (Sup.
Ct. 1897); Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556 (1873); In re Blumenthal's
Estate, 101 Misc. 83,167 N. Y. Supp. 252 (Sur. 1917) (for purpose of inherit-
ance tax); In re Norton, 96 Misc. 152, 159 N. Y. Supp. 619 (Sur. 1916).
10 Luria v. United States, 184, Fed. 643 (S. D. N. Y. 1911), aff'd 231
U. S. 9, 34 Sup. Ct 10 (1913) (for purpose of cancellation of naturaliza-
tion papers) ; In re Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336 (Sur. 1919)
(for purpose of succession); Stein v. Fleishmann, 237 Fed. 679 (S. D. N. Y.
1916) (for purpose of federal jurisdiction; diversity of citizenship) ; In re
Mlesa's Estate, 172 App. Div. 467, 159 N. Y. Supp. 59 (1st Dept. 1916) (for
purpose of taxation).
3.".Rourke v. Hanchett, 240 Mass. 557, 134 N. E. 355 (1922) (for purpose
of taxation); Pettit v. Lexington, 193 Ky. 679, 237 S. W. 391 (1922); In
re Paris' Estate, 107 Misc. 463, 176 N. Y. Supp. 879 (Sur. 1919) ; Kerby v.
Charlestown, 78 N. H. 301, 99 Atl. 835 (1916) ; Bartlett v. New Boston, 77
N. H. 476, 93 Atl. 796 (1915); Babcock v. Slater, 212 Mass. 434, 99 N. E.
173 (1913) ; Hesterly v. Ingram, 18 Ga. App. 532, 89 S. E. 1049 (1916) (for
the purpose of jurisdiction); Jones v. Reser, 61 Okla. 46, 160 Pac. 03
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On the other hand, many persons having had a domicil leave
it, and becoine rather aimless wanderers as far as establishing
a new home is concerned. Such persons very often continue to
use the place of their former home as headquarters, doing their
business, if any arises, there and returning there for visits be-
tween their travels. Into this category fall many retired or
semi-retired business or professional men,'2 and widows.13 The
actual time spent in residence may be slight and even less than
in some other place.14 The domicil is usually found to continue.'"
If, however, a new place is chosen as headquarters from which
to travel and in which to manage or have managed the business
affairs, this becomes the domicil.'6
When an elderly person leaves his home and goes to another
place to spend the rest of his life, his domicil is ordinarily
thought to be changed.' The usual case is where the aged per-
son goes to live with relatives. A removal for the mere purpose
of care during the last sickness may be held not to involve the
requisite "intent," especially where there is a question of undue
(1916) ; In re Weed's Estate, 120 Cal. 634, 53 Pac. 30 (1898). Cf. A=rnt-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 21. "The intention required for
the acquisition of a domicil of choice is an intention to make a home in
fact, and not an intention to acquire a domicil."
212 Brafman v. Brafman, 144 Md. 413, 125 Atl. 161 (1924) (for the
purpose of succession); Texana Oil & Refining Co. v. Belchio, 150 La. 88,
90 So. 522 (1922) (for purpose of attachment as non-resident-attachment
allowed); In re Martin's Estate, 173 App. Div. 1, 158 N. Y. Supp. 915 (1st
Dept. 1916) (for purpose of inheritance tax); In re Lankford's Estate,
272 Mo. f, 197 S. W. 147 (1917) (well established domicil abandoned,
domicil of origin returned to in fact).
'3 In re Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401, 103 At. 274 (1918) (for purpose
of succession); Schmoll v. Schenck, 40 Ind. App. 581, 82 N. E. 805 (1907).
14 Givernaud v. Variel, 86 N. J. Eq. 80, 97 Atl. 49 (1916), afJ'd 103 AtI.
1054 (1917) (for purpose of probate); Brafman v. Brafman and In rO
Martin's Estate, supra note 12; cases in note 13 supra.
'5 In re Beattie's Estate, 129 Misc. 241, 221 N. Y. Supp. 726 (Sur. 1927)
(for purpose of succession) ; In re Colburn's Estate, 186 Iowa 590, 173 N.
W. 35 (1919); In re Green's Estate, 167 N. Y. Supp. 1084 (Sur. 1917);
In re Grigg's Estate, 135 Minn. 353, 160 N. W. 1018 (1917); Givernaud v.
Variel, supra note 14 (domicil of origin abandoned but new "home" con-
tinued although traveling etc.).
16 In the case of migratory persons the courts are particularly hesitant to
find a change of domicil to a foreign country. Compare supra notes
9 and 10.
"1 In re Leonori's Estate, 223 N. Y. Supp. 777 (Sur. 1927) (for
purpose of successtion); Robinson v. Paxton, 210 Ky. 575, 276 S. W. 500
(1925); Holmes v. Holmes, 212 Ala. 597, 103 So. 884 (1925); Pattison v.
Firor, 146 Md. 243, 126 Atl. 109 (1924); Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Benning-
ton, 142 Md. 390, 121 Atl. 369 (1923) (for purpose of jurisdiction);
Staiar's Ad'nr v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 316, 239 S. W. 40 (1922) (for
purpose of taxation); In re Lankford's Estate, supra note 12.
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influence. 18 Here as in other types of cases, the courts are less
willing to find a change of domicil to a foreign country.V,
If, however, such a person goes to live with his family in a
neighboring place, but keeps up an active social and political
connection with the place of the former home, involving the
spending of considerable time there, the change is merely one of
residence.20 This is true also of the man who moves his family
from their former home to another town or city and, although
he continues to live with his family, at the same time continues
practically unchanged his business, political, and social relations
with the former place.21 These cases show the danger of putting
too much reliance on the statements, often correct, that the lo-
cation of a man's family determines his domicil.
In the case of a commuter who works during the week in one
place but returns to his family over the week-ends, or of the
travelling than whose work gives him only intermittent op-
portunity to be with his family, the location of the family does
determine his "intent." 2   From this comparatively simple type
of situation, the cases range into those two perplexing problems:
first, when a prolonged stay away from a former residence for
a particular purpose becomes the establishment of a new domi-
cil,23 and second, which of "two homes" is the "principal home."
18 Strathmann v. Kinkelaar, 105 Okla. 290, 233 Pac. 215 (1925) (for
purpose of probate); Sullivan v. Kenney, 148 Iowa 361, 126 N. V. 349
(1910) (senile dementia); In re Beattie's Estate, supra note 15 (domicil
not changed to sanitarium; planned to stay until death although conflict-
ing testimony as to "intent to make home").
19 McEwen v. McEwen, 50 N. D. 662, 197 N. W. 8G2 (1924) (for pur-
pose of succession).
20 Ashland v. Catlettsburg, 172 Ky. 364, 189 S. W. 454 (1916) (for
purpose of taxation).
21 In re Lyon's Estate, 117 Misc. 189, 191 N. Y. Supp. 260 (Sur. 1921),
aff'd 192 N. Y. Supp. 936 (for purpose of taxation); McHenry v. State,
119 Miss. 289, 80 So. 763 (1919) (for purpose of holding office). Contra:
Holmes v. Green, 73 Mass. 299 (1856) (for purpose of voting).
22 Smith v. Smith, 122 Va. 341, 94 S. E. 777 (1918) (for purposes of
succession); Coffey v. Mann, 200 Ill. App. 143 (1916); Feehan v. Trefry,
237 Mass. 169, 129 N. E. 292 (1921) (for purpose of taxation-domiciU
with wife, although declared intention to have it with parents where he
spent approximately the same amount of time); cf. Roberts v. Robertson,
123 Kan. 222, 254 Pac. 1026 (1927) (for purpose of registration of chattel
mortgage-family with him during week, week-ends at former residence,
domicil where he worked); Farrow v. Farrow, 162 Iowa 87, 143 N. W. 856
(1913) (for running of statute of limitations; years out of state with a few
short visits to family, but support of family; domicil not changed).
2 3 A, IRIC.-- LAW INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 24: "The motive
with which a person acquires a new dwelling-place does not determine the
question of the establishment of a domicil of choice, but it may b? important
evidence tending to show whether or not, when a new dwelling-place is
acquired, there is an intention to make a home there."
24Ibid. § 26. "When a person who has capacity to acquire a domicil of
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A person who leaves his former abode tentatively on a trial
trip, retains his domicil for a reasonable time.y A man who
moves his family into a town in order to put his children into
school, even though he lives with them, does not give up his
former domicil if he continues his business or political connec-
tions with it.2 6 If, however, there is no apparent reason to sup-
pose a return to the former domicil, a new one may be found
by the court.27  A student, dependent on his family even par-
tially, who spends his vacations with them, does not have a
domicil where he is studying.28 A person who establishes a new
residence for business reasons or to find work does not lose his
domicil if he can show a plan to return to the former residence
when that purpose is accomplished.2 9  Employment in govern-
ment service need involve no change of domicilY' Even em-
ployment by a firm that dictates residence may not force such
a change.2 1 On the other hand, the fact that employment is only
choice has more than one home, his domicil is in the earlier home, unless
he regards the second home as his principal home."
25 Glotfelty v. Brown, 148 Iowa 124, 126 N. W. 797 (1910) (for purpose
of taxation) ; State v. Scott, 171 Ind. 349, 86 N. E. 409 (1908) (for purpose
of eligibility to hold office); State v. Hays, 105 Minn. 399, 117 N, W. 615
(1908) ; Denver v. Sherret, 88 Fed. 226 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898) (for jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts); Saunders v. Flemingsburg, 163 Ky. 680, 174
S. W. 51 (1915) (for purpose of taxation; residence and business activities
for three years; change of domicil).
26 Smith v. Binford, 256 Pac. 366 (Idaho, 1927) (for purpose of tuition
for children); Alvaton Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 34 Ga. App. 151, 128
S. E. 781 (1925) (for purpose of attachment as non-resident at old
domicil); Cooper's Adm'r v. Commonwealth 121 Va. 338, 93 S. E. 680
(1917) (for purpose of tax at new residence); Denny v. Sumner, 134 Tenn.
468, 184 S. W. 14 (1915); Caufield v. Cravens, 138 La. 283, 70 So. 226
(1915) (for purpose of being a representative).
27 Kay v. Strobeck, 81 Colo. 144, 254 Pac. 150 (1927) (for purpose of
voting; laborers, even though they left town for harvest).
28 Seibold v. Wahl, 164 Wis. 82, 159 N. W. 546 (1916) (voting).
29 In re Martin's Estate, 185 N. C. 472, 117 S. E. 561 (1923) (for pur-
pose of succession; return delayed only because of illness); State v. Tomsa,
126 La. 682, 52 So. 988 (1910) (for purpose of qualifying for jury service
-employment out of state previous year); LeBlanc v. "Loughridge, 153 La.
109, 95 So. 419 (1923) (for purpose of jurisdiction; supervision of harvest-
ing; family at former home).
30 Harris v. Harris, 215 N. W. 661 (Iowa, 1927) (for purpose of
divorce) ; Johnston v. Benton, 73 Cal. App. 571, 239 Pac. 60 (1925) (for
purpose of jurisdiction); Ex parte White, 228 Fed. 88 (D. N. H. 1915)
(for purpose of taxation); Lyon v. Vance, 46 W. Va. 781, 34 S. E. 761
(1899) (for purpose of attachment); cf. AMNERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 23: "A person cannot acquire a domicil of choice by any
act done under legal or physical compulsion."
31 United States v. Knight, 291 Fed. 129 (D. Mont. 1923) (for purpose of
cancellation of naturalization papers); In re Deans, 208 Fed. 1018 (W. D.
Ark. 1913) (for purpose of interrupting "residence" for naturalization) ; In
re Rooney, supra note 8 (for purpose of voting).
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for a definite period and that residence is presumably dependent
on that employment may not prevent the establishment of a new
domicil3 2 A person who leaves his dwelling-place, even perma-
nently, for reasons of health, does not necessarily acquire a new
domicil, especially if a change in national residence is involved.
The court's determination of the establishment of a new domicil
is influenced by the kind of case in which the problem arises."
There is, in all these situations; a presumption in favor of the
continuance of the old domicil.3 5 The doctrine of reverter, how-
ever, is followed little in this country.sr
Many persons have their year arranged in a cycle of two or
more residences; certain months are regularly spent at one place
and others spent at another, with a possible interregnum of
travel. Sometimes it is obvious from the amount of time or the
importance of the social or business affiliations, that the "home"
is at one place and that any other dwelling place is merely
secondary. In this case the domicil is at the "home," even
though there are conflicting statements of intention.Y The dif-
2 McHaney v. Cunningham, 4 F. (2d) 725 (W. D. La. 1925) (for pur-
pose of jurisdiction of federal courts; even though intention to move at the
end of the school year). Compare pauper settlement cases saying domicil
changed with each new job. Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 82 At].
193 (1912); Wilbraham v. Ludlow, 99 Mass. 589 (1363).
33 Croop v. Walton, 157 X. E. 275 (Ind. 1927) (for purpose of taxation;
health of family); Miller v. Brinton, 294 1ll. 177, 128 N. E. 370 (1920)
(for purpose of succession); Cabot v. Boston, 66 Mass. 52 (18v,) (for
purpose of taxation; temporary illness). On the point of change of national
residence cf. notes 9 supra and 34 infra.
34 Cf. Dupuy v. Wurtz, supra note 9 (no change of domicil for purpose
of succession although practically complete factual abandonment of old
residence and establishment of permanent headquarters abroad); Luria
v. United States, supra note 10 (for purpose of cancellation of naturaliza-
tion papers, forced change of residence because of health did not prevent
change of domicil); Gold v. Gold, 100 Conn. 607, 124 Atl. 246 (192t)
(change of domicil for purpose of probate, although not complete severing
of relations with former residence; change to different state); Eisele v.
Oddie, 128 Fed. 941 (D. Nev. 1904) (for purpose of jurisdiction of federal
courts whole burden of negating subjective intent on perzon setting up
change and objecting to jurisdiction; no affiliations with former residence;
change to different state).
3 5 AMERICA LAW INsTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 25: "A domicil once
established continues until it is superceded by another domicil." In other
words, the burden of proof is on him who alleges the change of domicil.
31 Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 H. L. 441 (1869) (for purpose of legitimatizing
child). Contra: In re Jones' Estate, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N. W. 227 (1921)
(for purpose of succession). For a discussion of the two rules see, Levitt,
op. cit. supra note 2. (1922) 7 IowA L. BULL. 118; (1921) 65 SoL. J.
690; (1921) 35 HARv. L. REv. 189; (1914) 1 VA. L. REv. 396.
37 In re Harlness Estate, 183 App. Div. 396, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1024 (1st
Dept 1918) (for purpose of taxation); Holt v. Hendee, 243 Ill. 288, 93




ficulty arises when neither place clearly predominates. Where
the express intention is to have the domicil of origin continue,
it is given preference over other possible domicils 8 Where the
intention of the person is not consistently expressed and the
claims of both places are equal, the domicil of origin or the prior
acquired domicil is favored." Usually, other things being equal,
a clear declaration in a will is recognized as showing the "inten-
tion" of the testator.40
The idea of intent to make a home as an essential element of
domicil is inaccurate and inadequate. The adoption of "home"
as the "fundamental conception underlying domicil" by the
American Law Institute and by many courts is, however, not far
from right. The necessity of having a means of determining the
status of an individual requires the adoption of some such con-
ception as "domicil" or "nationality." Historically, these were
much the same. When the conflict of laws began to be a prob-
lem, the relation to the "tribe," nationality or the objective evi-
dence of it, home or domicil, became the means of settling them.
"Home" and "domicil" could be treated as synonomous when
persons were fairly stationary. Since mere residence did not
always determine the group with which a person was affiliated,
the courts could say that there were two elements of domicil-
the factum and the animus. What the courts wished to express
by the animus was probably the relationship to the group as evi-
denced by making a home within its control. Where in fact
there is practically none of this animus towards any group or
where it is split, what the courts seem to be doing, and what they
might well do more consciously, is to ascertain what the purpose
of the domicil in the particular case is, and to decide on the
specific facts, what place has the greater claim on the individual.
38 Chambers v. Hathaway, 187 Cal. 104, 200 Pac. 931 (1921) (for the
purpose of succession); In re Frick's Estate, 116 Misc. 488, 190 N. Y. Supp.
262 (Sur. 1921) (for purpose of taxation); Dunn v. Trefry, 260 Fed.
147 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) ; Semple v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 675, 205 S. W.
789 (1918).
39 In re Lydig's Estate, 191 App. Div. 117, 180 N. Y. Supp. 843 (1st
Dept. 1920) (for purpose of succession); Bowen v. Commonwealth, 126 Va.
182, 101 S. E. 232 (1919) (for purpose of taxation); Gilman v. Gilman, 52
Me. 165 (1863) (for purpose of succession-will invalidated-contra to
declaration of residence in will). Contra: Hurst v. Flemingburg, 172 Ky.
127, 188 S. W. 1085 (1916) (for purpose of taxation; declared intent where
farm was, although domicil of origin and most of time spent in other state).
40 In re Zayas' Estate, 112 Misc. 437, 183 N. Y. Supp. 142 (Sur. 1920);
In re Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552, 107 At]. 888 (1919); Holyoke v.
Holyoke, 110 Me. 469, 87 Atl. 40 (1913); In re Newcomb's Estate, 192
N. Y. 238, 84 N. E. 950 (1908); Frame v. Thormann, 102 Wis. 653, 79
N. W. 39 (1899), aff'd 176 U. S. 350, 20 Sup. Ct. 446 (1900); Pres. of
Harvard v. Gore, 22 Mass. 370 (1827); cf. In re Paullin's Will, 92 N. J.
Eq. 419, 113 Atl. 240 (1921) (husband told tax assessor of choice of
domicil between two equally important residences before wife's death).
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SAVINGS BANK TRUSTS IN NEW YORK
The attempt of the New York Court of Appeals to lay down
an all inclusive rule whereby questions arising out of so-called
savings bank trusts could be expeditiously decided ' has met
with indifferent success. Litigation involving problems not
specifically covered by the rule has often arisen subsequent to
the Totten case.2 It is interesting to note that the first New
York case deciding a question involving savings bank trusts
laid down a rule very similar to, if not identical with, that of
the Totten case.3
It is believed that a study of the cases leading up to the
Totten case would be helpful in understanding the present New
York rule. Martin v. Funk4 decided that the bare fact of a
deposit in trust for another was sufficient evidence of an in-
tention to create a trust so that the amount on deposit at the
death of the depositor belonged to the stated beneficiaryP The
doctrine of this case was both modified and extended in Miabie
v. Bailey," where it was said that the mere form of the deposit
only presumptively 7 created a trust, but that subsequent with-
'M atter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904).
2 The American Digest contains citations to '3 such cases prior to the
decision of the Totten case and 28 such cases subsequent thereto.
3 "Witzel v. Chapin, 3 Bradf. Sur. 386 (N. Y. 1855). A deposit was
made in trust for another. No other evidence of the purpose of the deposit
was produced. There were subsequent deposits and withdrawals made.
The depositor had died. Judgment was given for the stated beneficiary
in an action to recover the balance on deposit. The court said that it was
not necessary that the cestui have knowledge of the deposit; that deposits
of this character are not conclusive evidence of an intention to crcate a
trust, but may be rebutted by evidence of an inconsistent intent, and that
the original trust is revocable until the death of the depositor.
475 N. Y. 134 (1878).
5 Accord: Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297 (1C8). cf. Boone v. Citizens
Say. Bank, 84 N. Y. 83 (1881) where the same rule was laid down, but
the action was by the cestui against the bank which had paid the depositor's
administrator on presentation of the passbook. The court held the bank
privileged to pay the administrator in the absence of notice from the
cestui. Cf. also Bishop v. Seaman's Bank, 33 App. Div. 181, 53 N. Y. Supp.
488 (1st Dept. 1898) where the passbook, though not delivered to the
beneficiary, was acquired after his death by his personal representative
and the balance paid to the latter by the bank. The bank was discharged.
6 95 N. Y. 206 (1884).
7Ibid. 210, the court said: ". . . the character of such a transaction,
as creating a trust, is not conclusively established by the mere fact of the
deposit, so as to preclude evidence of contemporaneous facts constituting
res gestae, to show that the real motive of the depositor was not to create
a trust . ..
Accord: Weber v. Weber, 9 Daly 211 (N. Y. C. P. 1880) (testimony of
depositor that he had a contrary intent); Lee v. Kennedy, 25 Misc. 140, 54
N. Y. Supp. 155 (Sup. Ct. 1898) (evidence of contemporaneous state-
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drawals by the depositor were not "legitimate" evidence of a
contrary intent." The beneficiary of the trust recovered all of
the money that had been deposited and withdrawn. The ir-
revocable character of the trust, however, was further established
by holding that a subsequent will disposing of the funds on
deposit did not destroy the trust.10
Shortly thereafter the court felt grave concern over the exist-
ing rule because the device in question was commonly used for
motives unassociated with a purpose to transfer the beneficial
interest, and in the case of Beaver v. Beaver,"' a deposit in the
name of another person was denied the effect of a gift. A state-
ment in that case that such a deposit, without more, was in-
effective to show an intent to make a gift 12 has since been in-
ments) ; Macy v. Williams, 83 Hun 243, 31 N. Y. Supp. 620 (2d Dept. 1894),
aff'd 144 N. Y. 701, 39 N. E. 858 (1895) (contemporaneous acts).
8 Accord: Jenkins v. Baker, 77 App. Div. 509, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1074 (2d
Dept. 1902); Proseus v. Porter, 20 App. Div. 44, 46 N. Y. Supp. 656 (2d
Dept. 1897); Williams v. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 51 App. Div. 332, 64 N. Y.
Supp. 1021 (2d Dept. 1900), app. dismissed 165 N. Y. 676, 59 N. E. 1132
(1901). In the Mabie case it was also held that subsequent withdrawals
by the depositor of all the funds did not of itself raise a presumption of
an intent to repudiate so as to start the running of the Statute of Limita-
tions. It is presumed that the trust was intended to terminate at the
death of the depositor and the Statute then begins to run.
9 Accord: Scott v. Harbeck, 49 Hun. 292, 1 N. Y. Supp. 788 (2d Dept.
1888); Robertson v. McCarty, 54 App. Div. 103, 66 N. Y. Supp. 327 (2d
Dept. 1900); Hutton v. Smith, 74 App. Div. 284, 77 N. Y. Supp. 523 (1st
Dept. 1902) (lien impressed on realty purchased by trustee with with-
drawals). But cf. Grafing v. Heilman, 1 App. Div. 260, 37 N. Y. Supp.
253 (2d Dept. 1896) (implication that withdrawals by depositor create
presumption that original trust was created with reservation of power
to make them).
10 Weaver v. Emigrant Say. Bank, 17 Abb. N. C. 82 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1885). Nor could the trust, once established be revoked by a change of
beneficiaries. Farleigh v. Cadman, 159 N. Y. 169, 53 N. E. 808 (1899).
Contra: Jennings v. Hennessy, 26 Misc. 265, 55 N. Y. Supp. 833 (Sup. Ct.
1899), aff'd 40 App. Div. 633, 58 N. Y. Supp. 1142 (1st Dept. 1899).
U 117 N. Y. 421, 22 N. E. 940 (1889). "It may be justly said that a
deposit in a savings bank by one person, of his own money to the credit
of another, is consistent with an intent on the part of the depositor to
give the money to the other. But it does not, we think, of itself, without
more, authorize an affirmative finding that the deposit was made with
that intent . . . We cannot close our eyes to the -vell known practice
of persons depositing in savings banks money to the credit of real or
fictitious persons, with no intention of divesting themselves of ownership.
It is attributable to various reasons; reasons connected with taxation;
rules of the bank limiting the amount which any one individual may keep
on deposit; the desire to obtain high rates of interest where there is
discrimination based on the amount of deposits, and the desire, on the
part of many persons, to veil or conceal from others knowledge of their
pecuniary condition." Ibid. 430, 22 N. E. at 942.
12Supra note 11. But cf. In re George's Estate, 23 Abb. N. C. 43, 3
N. Y. Supp. 426 (Sur. 1889), where the only other evidence besides a do-
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discriminately quoted in decisions involving trusts, notwithstand-
ing that the rule of Martin v. Funk 13 was expressly recognized.'
The suggestion in the Mabie case that the presumption of a
trust could be overcome by evidence of cotemporamcouzs acts
or declarations showing a contrary intent was thereafter en-
forced in its negative implication, i. e., that szubscqutcnzt declara-
tions are inadmissable.'s But where the depositor was alive,
his testimony to the effect that at the time of the deposit he did
not intend to create a trust, was admissible and sufficient to
overcome the inference that a trust was created21 The pre-
sumption that a trust was established could, of course, be
strengthened by other corroborative evidence of such an intent.27
The process of retrenchment which was indicated in the Bcavcr
case was continued so that very little evidence of an intention
not to create a trust as indicated by contemporaneous facts suf-
ficed to convince the court? 8 Logrically the fact that the benefi-
ciary predeceased the depositor should have had no effect on
the original trust intent, but one cannot but be convinced that
courts were largely influenced by such a circurnstance.19 And
posit in the name of another was the fact that the donee was a thrift-
less son of the depositor and it was held to be an irrevocable gift. A
deposit in the name of another "subject to the sole control of" the depositor
together with evidence of an intention to benefit that party has been held
to create a trust. Millard v. Clark, So Hun 141, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (Id
Dept. 1894).
3 Supra note 4.
U Supra note 11, at 428, 22 N. E. at 492.
15 Hyde v. Kitchen, 69 Hun 280, 23 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1st Dept. 1893);
but cf. Decker v. Union Dime Say. Bank, 15 App. Div. 553, 44 N. Y.
Supp. 521 "(2d Dept. 1897) (in saying that subsequent declarations by the
depositor of an original intent not to create a trust were not sufficient
to overcome other evidence indicating a trust intent, the court apparently
assumed that subsequent declarations were admissible); Haux v. Dry Doc]:
Say. Bank, 2 App. Div. 165, 37 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dept. 1890), aff'd
154 N. Y. 736, 49 N. E. 1097 (1897).
:1 Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43, 41 N. E. 412 (1895); Mat-
ter of Barefield, 177 N. Y. 387, 69 N. E. 732 (1904).
a57Macy v. Williams, 55 Hun 489, 8 N. Y. Supp. 658 (2d Dept. 1890),
ajF'd 27 N. E. 409 (1891); Grafing v. Heilman, uspra note 9; Decker v.
Union Dime Say. Bank, 15 App. Div. 553, 44 N. Y. Supp. 521 (2d Dept.
1897); Proseus v. Porter, supra note 8; cf. Martin v. Martin, 40 App.
Div. 445, 61 N. Y. Supp. 813 (4th Dept. 1899), app. dismissed 100 N. Y.
611, 59 N. E. 1126 (1901); Harrison v. Totten, 53 App. Div. 178, 65 N.
Y. Supp. 725 (1st Dept. 1900); Miller v. Seaman's Bank, 33 Misc. '08,
68 N. Y. Supp. 983 (Sup. Ct. 1901); Williams v. Brooklyn Say. Bank,
spra note 8; Scallam v. Brooks, 54 App. Div. 248, 00 N. Y. Supp. 591
(1st Dept. 1900).
38 Cf. Haux v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, supra note 15.
'19 Ibid.; Cunningham v. Davenport, supra note 16; but see Bishop v. Sea-
man's Bank, 33 App. Div. 181, 184, 53 N. Y. Supp. 488, 490 (1st Dept.
1898); cf. Robinsbn v. Appleby, 69 App. Div. 509, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1 (2d
Dept 1902), aff'd 173 N. Y. 626, 66 N. E. 1115 (1903).
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since jurisdiction is denied to the Court of Appeals to review
findings of "fact" when they have been unanimously affirmed
by the Appellate Division,20 very little supervision remained in
the hands of that Court in enforcing the rules theretofore pro-
mulgated.2 1 Moreover the court of last resort, it would seem,
occasionally erred in applying the rules previously announced, 22
and finally a lower court asserted that although the form of de-
posit together with a declaration of intent to create a trust had
the effect of establishing a trust, nevertheless the estate of the
depositor was not responsible for withdrawals. 23
In the face of such confusion, vacillation, and uncertainty it
is not strange that the Court finally determined to formulate
a comprehensive rule that would settle all problems connected
with savings bank trusts:
"A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name
as trustee for another, standing alone does not establish an ir-
revocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a
tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies
or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or
declaration such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the
beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary
without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of dis-
affirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was
created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor." 24
20 N. Y. Const. Art. VI, § 9: "No unanimous decision of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court that there is evidence supporting or tend-
ing to sustain a finding of fact or a verdict not directed by the court, shall
be reviewed by the Court of Appeals."
21In Farleigh v. Cadman, supra note 10, the Court of Appeals held that
the question of whether there was a trust intent was a question of "fact"
and that therefore unanimous affirmance by the Appellate Division of a
finding by the trial court of a trust intent precluded them from reviewing
the question. See also Morris v. Sheehan, 234 N. Y. 366, 138 N. E. 23
(1922).
2 The defendant made a deposit in his own name in trust for X. Various
withdrawals and deposits were made, but the account at one time con-
tained $3,000. At a time when the amount on deposit exceeded the original
deposit, but was less than $3,000, the depositor made an unequivocal de-
claration of trust in favor of X. Thereafter the beneficiary died. Shortly
afterwards the defendant withdrew all the money on deposit. In an
action by the beneficiary's personal representative, it was held that the
original deposit- presumptively created a trust, but judgment was given
only for the amount on deposit at the time the account was closed. Robin-
son v. Appleby, supra, note 19.
23 Matter of Biggars, 39 Misc. 426, 80 N. Y. Supp. 214 (Sur. 1902).
Contra: Marsh v. Keogh, 82 App. Div. 503, 81 N. Y. Supp. 825 (2d Dept.
1903).
24 Matter of Totten, supra note 1, at 125, 71 N. E. at 752. Several ac-
counts were opened by the decedent in trust for the plaintiff. The ac-
counts were at all times treated by the depositor as his own and numerous
deposits and withdrawals were made. At the depositor's death, all the
money on deposit at the time was paid to the plaintiff, but the latter claimed
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What is meant by a "tentative" trust? The point becomes
important in those cases in which the form of the deposit is the
only evidence of a trust intent and the cestdi has predeceased
the depositor. Under the rule of Martin v. Funk 25 and Mabie v.
Badley 26 the fundamental question in such a situation is: as of
what instant of time is it presumed that a trust was intended?
It was impliedly held to be the time at which the deposit was
made since the subsequent death of the beneficiary, in theory,
did not defeat the trust.-2 7 But under the tentative trust doctrine
it is held that the predecease of the beneficiary defeats the trust
on the theory that no trust is completed until the death of the
depositor and that if at that time the stated beneficiary is also
dead there is no one for whom the trust can be created.23 Thus
"tentative trust" is interpreted as meaning not merely that the
trust is only presumptively created 2 9 and that it is revocable at
any time by the depositor,:3 but that no trust is created until
that an irrevocable trust had been established and sought to recover from
the decedent's estate all the money that had ever been on deposit in thine
accounts. Judgment was given for defendant. In the course of the opinion,
the court inferred that it thought the accounts had originally been opened
for business reasons. If such were a finding of fact, under the rule
stated, since a presumption only exists at the death of depositor that a
trust was created, such a presumption would have been overcome, and
the estate would have been under no duty to pay the amounts on deposit
to the beneficiary. Under the facts, however, the point was not involved.
25SSupra note 4.
26 Supra note 6.
2 7Supra note 19.
2 8 Matter of U. S. Trust Co., 117 App. Div. 178, 102 N. Y. Supp. 271
(1st Dept. 1907), aff'd 189 N. Y. 500, 81 N. E. 1177 (1907); Matter of
Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N. Y. Supp. 176 (2d Dept. 1905); Gar-
vey v. Clifford, 114 App. Div. 193, 99 N. Y. Supp. 555 (1st Dept. 1906);
Matter of Duffy, 127 App. Div. 74, 111 N. Y. Supp. 77 (2d Dept. 1903).
But cf. dissenting opinion of Ingraham, J. in Matter of U. S. Trust Co.,
supra, in which Matter of Buwinkle, supra, was distinguished on the
ground that the tentative trust was expressly revoked by the depositor after
the cestui's death and Garvey v. Clifford, supra, was distinguished on the
ground that under the facts disclosed no intention to create a trust in
favor of the claimant's intestate could be presumed as her right name
was not used. The alleged dictum in that case was also interpreted as
meaning that is is presumed that the depositor intended the trust to be
conditioned on the cestui surviving the depositor. A like interpretation
has been given to the holding of Matter of U. S. Trust Co., supmr. In re
Barbey's Estate, 114 N. Y. Supp. 725 (Sur. 1908). In the last caz it
was held that the recipient of a fund under a tentative trust is subject
to a succession tax, it being a testamentary disposition for that purpose.
Accord: Matter of Palm, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1044 (Sur. 1914); Matter of
Bender, 182 N. Y. Supp. 217 (Sur. 1915). Contra: Matter of Henderson,
198 N. Y. Supp. 799 (Sur. 1923); ef. Stimson, Whaa Rcvocablc TruIts Ar c
Subject to an Inheritance Tar (1927) 25 MlicH. L. REV. 839, 840.
29 Iorris v. Sheehan, 234 N. Y. 366, 138 N. E. 23 (1922).
30 Cf. Rush v. So. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 65 Misc. 66, 119 N. Y. Supp.
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the death of the depositor, unless it is in the meantime rendered
absolute by an unequivocal affirmation.3 1 Consistent with such
a theory, it is held'that creditors may reach funds held in tenta-
tive trust, where the deceased depositor's estate is insufficient
to meet his debts.3 2 But as a matter of abstract logic the theory
fails so long as our concept of trust is fundamentally based on
a declaration of intent, for it seems rather far fetched to pre-
sume such an intent as of the time of the depositor's death rather
than as of the time the deposit was made. The same result
could be reached consistently with our orthodox concepts by
presuming from the bare form of the deposit, an intention to
create a trust, a reservation of a power of partial or total rev-
ocation, and a condition that the trust lapse unless the stated
beneficiary survive the depositor. The point is, however, that
no theory at all is necessary. The last thing that anyone would
suggest is that it is possible to ascertain from the bare form
of the deposit what the party intended. And the justification
for the present rule as interpreted is merely that the court
deemed it the most feasible.
Although there would seem to be little room for interpretation
of that part of the rule providing for the completion of the
tentative trust by an unequivocal act or declaration,33 such as
delivery of the pass book,' * or notice to the beneficiary, con-
siderable confusion exists in its application. The rule has ap-
parently been modified to mean that such additional facts only
presumptively create an irrevocable trust; '1 that delivery of
726 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Roughan v. Chenango Valley Say. Bank, 158 App.
Div. 786, 144 N. Y. Supp. 508 (4th Dept. 1913).
31 For a similar analysis and a criticism of the use of the terms "tenta-
tive trust" and "revocation" as descriptive of the situation, see Bogert,
The Creaton of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits (1916) 1 CORN. L. Q.
159, 171, n. 86.
32 Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529
(2d Dept. 1908).
33 O'Brien v. Williamsburg Say. Bank, 101 App. Div. 108, 91 N. Y. Supp.
908 (2d Dept. 1905); Matter of King, 51 Misc. 375, 101 N. Y. Supp. 279
(Sur. 1906).
-1 Stockert v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 155 App. Div. 123, 139 N. Y. Supp.
986 (1st Dept. 1913). And where an irrevocable trust is so estalished,
the fund is not subject to the succession tax. In re Reynold's Estate,
163 N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sur. 1916).
5 Matthews v. Brooklyn Say. Bank, 208 N. Y. 508, 102 N. E. 520
(1913) (delivery to the beneficiary of the passbook found to be merely for
"safekeeping" and the fact that the beneficiary was present when the ac-
count was opened given no effect). Cf. Hemmerich v. Union Dime Say.
Inst., 205 N. Y. 366, 98 N. E. 499 (1912) where the plaintiff's father had
deposited money in the defendant bank in trust for the plaintiff, had given
her the passbook, and had told her that the money in the bank was for
her. In an action to recover the money from the bank on the theory that
the father had revoked the tentative trust created by the deposit by mak-
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the pass book to the beneficiary together with declarations to
third persons affirming the donative intent,20 or knowledge by
the beneficiary procured from the depositor,37 do not conclusively
establish an irrevocable trust. Possession of the pass book by
the beneficiary after the depositor's death has been held to give
rise to a presumption of delivery,33 but such a presumption has
also been refused.' An account opened in the name of another
than the depositor as trustee for a third party merely creates
a tentative trust revocable by the depositor, even though the
passbook is delivered to the trustee.4' But unequivocal acts
may show an intention to create an irrevocable trust.y
Another problem left obscure by the rule announced in the
Totten case is whether changing an existing account into a trust
account amounts to an unequivocal act or declaration creating
an absolute trust. That it does not necessarily seems to be well
settled; 42 that it is evidence of such an intention is equally well
established. 43 In a recent case 44 it appeared that the decedent
had transferred by a formal document a deposit in her own
name to herself as trustee for a hospital and signed a formal
acceptance of such a trust. Subsequently in executing her vill
she indicated an intention of disposing of this property in it,
although no specific mention of the account appeared in the
will. In an action by the executor against the bank, in which
the hospital was interpleaded, judgment was given for the latter
on the ground that the formal change of the original account to
a trust account was an unequivocal declaration of trust.4 5 The
ing an absolute gift of the money on deposit, the court refused to find such
an intent and sent the case back for a new trial to ascertain whether an
irrevocable trust had been created which was enforceable in "equity."
38 Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 122 App. Div. 623, 107 N. Y. Supp. 527 (1st
Dept. 1907), rev'd on another ground, 195 N. Y. 433, 88 N. E. 750 (1909).
37 Gf. Moran v. Ferchland, 113 Misc. 1, 184 N. Y. Supp. 429 (Sup. CL
1920).
3 8 Matter of Davis, 119 App. Div. 35, 103 N. Y. Supp. 946 (2d Dept.
1907).
39 Cf. In re Beaman's Estate, 163 N. Y. Supp. 800 (Sur. 1916).
4 0 Latten v. Van Ness, 107 App. Div. 393, 95 N. Y. Supp. 97 (2d Dept.
1905), af'd 184 N. Y. 601, 77 N. E. 1190 (1906).
41 Willard v. Willard, 103 Misc. 544, 170 N. Y. Supp. 830 (Sup. CL
1918).
42 Cunningham v. Davenport, supra note 16; cf. Matter of Bolin, 130 N.
Y. 177, 32 N. E. 626 (1892) (deposit in joint account).
43Jennings v. Hennessy, supra note 10 (delivery of passboo!: alzo);
Proseus v. Porter, supra note 8 (same); Stockert v. Dry Dock Say. Banl:,
supra note 34 (same); ef. Willard v. Willard, supra, note 41 (change from
deposit in own name as trustee to deposit in another's name as trustee);
In re Reynold's Estate, supra note 34 (deposit in joint account). But ef.
Matter of Bolin, ftpra note 42.
44 Marshall v. Franklin Society, 131 Misc. 611 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
45 The following curious statement appears at the end of the opinion,
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statements at the time the will was made, indicating that the
decedent thought she then had a power of disposal, were clearly
inadmissible to show that she had no intent to create a trust
by her original declaration.
4
If, however, no finding of an original intention to create an
absolute trust had been made, the question of revocation by will
would have arisen. It has been argued that since a will speaks
only from the time of the death of the testator, the tentative
trust becomes presumptively absolute at the same instant as the
will takes effect.4  A rebuttal has been made, which is just as
technical in character, to the effect that the reason a trust is
presumed at the death of the depositor when the deposit is left
unexplained is that a trust was intended in order to avoid mak-
ing a will, and that a will having been made, the presumption
of an intention to create a trust could no longer arise.4  The
difficulty with the latter argument is that making a will without
specifically disposing of the trust accounts49 or without con-
temporaneous declarations " that they were intended to be dis-
posed of, has never been held to affect the tentative trust. And
the obvious answer to the former argument is that revocation
does not depend on the will taking effect but merely on a declara-
tion of disaffirmance.51
It seems, therefore, that in those cases where the actual in-
fent of the depositor may appear from surrounding facts or
declarations, the present New York rule provides that such in-
supra note 44, at 613: "As there is no evidence of a revocation of this
explicit gift or._trust, judgment is directed in favor of the interpleader."
It seems tolerably clear that if an absolute trust has been found to have
been created by an "unequivocal declaration," no revocation thereafter
could be made. Stockert v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, supra note 34; of. Kelly
v. Beers, 194 N. Y. 60, 86 N. E. 985 (1909).
" Supra note 15; Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 195 N. Y. 433, 88 N. E. 750
(1909); In re Beaman's Estate, supra note 39.
7 See Stockert v. Dry Dock Say. Inst., supra note 34, at 129, 139 N. Y.
Supp. at 989.
48 Walsh v. Emigrant Bank, 106 Misc. 628, 176 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Sup.
Ct. 1919), aff'd 182 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1st Dept. 1920). The reason for
the presumption of a trust as presented in the text is found in Matter of
Totten, supra note 1, at 124, 71 N. E. at 752.
41) A specific disposition by will of the funds on tentative trust is held
to be a revocation. Thomas v. Newburg Say. Bank, 73 Misc. 308, 130
N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1911), aff'd 147 App. Div. 937, N. Y. Supp.
(2d Dept. 1911); Moran v. Ferchland, supra note 37.
"o A disposition by will of all the testator's property where all the
testator owned was represented by the funds on tentative trust revokes the
trust. Matter of Beagan, 112 Misc. 292, 183 N. Y. Supp. 941 (Sur. 1920).
Likewisr where there were contemporaneous declarations of an intent that
a general disposition by the will of the testator's property shall include
the funds on tentative trust. Cf. Walsh v. Emigrants Bank, supra note
146.
, 51 oran v. Ferchland, supra note 37.
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tent should be determined; that where the form of the deposit is
the only evidence produced, despite possible speculation as to the
real purpose of the deposit, the most expeditious method of
settling the problem is to allow the stated beneficiary to have it
providing he is alive.5 2 Although the latter result may not ac-
cord with some orthodox notions as to the elements of "a trust,"
nevertheless it perhaps reflects the expectation of the average
man in the street. Moreover, if the tentative trust doctrine is
anomalous, there is all the more reason for deciding problems
other than those specifically covered by the rule, not in the light
of trust theory, but solely in accord with policy.
INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATIONS
There is no clear distinction between innocent and cul-
pable misrepresentations. Obviously, if a party has actual
knowledge that certain statements are untrue, his misrepresenta-
tions cannot be regarded as innocent. But whether a negligent
statement is to be considered innocent, and whether a repre-
sentation made in the belief of its truth though the party making
it had no actual knowledge of its truth or falsity is to be con-
sidered in the same category, is largely a matter of convenience.
There seems to be a fairly clear line between such cases and
those in which the representing party had actual knowledge (as
found by the judge or jury) that his statements were false, and
for this reason it is more convenient to consider all statements
innocent except those made with actual knowledge of their falsity.
That a party might recover "in equity" the consideration paid
by him as a result of innocent misrepresentations is well recog-
nizedI but that a somewhat similar action might be maintaincd
52 For a criticism of the rule on the ground that it violates both the
theory of a trust and the policy of the statute of wills Fee, Larrinore,
Judicial Legislation In New York (1905) 14 YAL., LAW JOURNAL 312, 315,
316. Suggestions have been made that the tentative trust doctrine has
been more or less codified by the following section in the Banking Law of
New York: "When any deposit shall be made by any person in trust for
another, and no other or further notice of the e.dstence and terms of a
legal and valid trust shall have been given in writing to such savings bank,
in the event of the death of the trustee, the deposit or any part thereof,
together with the dividends thereon, may be paid to the person for whom
the deposit was made." N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1993) c. 8, § 249 (2).
See Matter of Henderson, stpra note 28, at 800; BOSGERT, TRuSTS (1921) 86,
n. 50. The identical and similar statutes are to be found in a great num-
ber of the states, and it is believed that they do not purport to affect the
relations inter se of the claimants to the fund. BRADY, BANK DEPOSITS
(1911) 37.
'Lombardi v. Sinanides, 71 Cal. App. 272, 25 Pac. 455 (192); Smith
v. Bricker, 86 Iowa 285, 53 N. W. 250 (1892); Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 Ch.
D. 1 (1881); Newman v. Claflin Co., 107 Ga. 89, 32 S. E. 943 (1899);
Post v. Liberty, 45 Mont. 1, 121 Pac. 475 (1912); Bloomquist v. Far.on,
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by him "at law" is more doubtful. In the recent case of Seneca
Wire & Mfg. Co. v. Leach & Co., 2 however, the action was sus-
tained. The plaintiff was told by the defendant's representative
that certain notes were a good investment and that application
would be made, and later, that such application had been made,
to list them on the New York Stock Exchange. Relying on these
representations the plaintiff bought the securities, paying the
purchase price to the defendant. The corporation in which
plaintiff had invested subsequently failed and plaintiff learned
that the securities had never been listed and that the defendant
had never intended to list them. The good faith of defendant's
representative was not questioned. The plaintiff offered to
return the notes and demanded back the purchase price. Upon
the defendant's refusal, the plaintiff brought an action "at law"
to recover the purchase price. The lower court gave judgment
for the defendant which was reversed on appeal, and a new trial
ordered2 . Cardozo, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the
undivided court, said that the same rules should be applied in
actions "at law" based upon rescission as to actions "in equity"
for rescission.
4
A similar action has been allowed in the Federal court,' and
222 N. Y. 375, 118 N. E. 855 (1918); Canadian Agency v. Assets Co., 165
App. Div. 96, 150 N. Y. Supp. 758 (1st Dept. 1914); Weller v. Bartlett,
45 N. Y. Supp. 626 (Sup. Ct. 1894); Woodruff v. Garner, 27 Ind. 4
(1866); Smith v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26 (U. S. 1839); of. New Theatre
Corp. v. Bischoff, 210 App. Div. 125, 205 N. Y. Supp. 641 (2d Dept. 1924).
But of. Crooker v. White 162 Ala. 476, 50 So. 227 (1909).
2247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 700 (1928).
3 Continental Ins. Co. v. Equitable Co., 127 Misc. 45, 215 N. Y. Supp. 281
(Sup. Ct. 1926) reached the same result as the principal case.
4 "It seeks relief on the same ground that rescission might be maintained
in equity by proving that the representations were false in fact, and
misled the plaintiff into making the purchase .... As no equitable relief
was required, it was inappropriate, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to
maintain an action for rescission in equity. All it wanted was the return
of its money. Action at law was, therefore, proper. The proof required
was no different from that which would be required in equity ... It is not
necessary in order that a contract may be rescinded for fraud or misrep-
resentation that the party making the misrepresentation should have known
that it wai false. Innocent misrepresentation is sufficient, and this rule
applies to actions at law based upon rescission as well as to actions for
rescission in equity."
5 Joslyn v. Cadillac Automobile Co., 177 Fed. 863 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910).
The plaintiff bought an automobile on the defendant's representation that
it would develop thirty horse power. In fact there was evidence to show
that it would develop only twenty-four. The plaintiff brought an action to
recover the purchase price. The court directed a verdict for the defendant
on the ground that no misrepresentation had been shown. The upper court
held that there was sufficient evidence of misrepresentation to go to the
jury. The fact that no actual knowledge of the falsity of the remarks
could be shown, was considered immaterial. "It certainly is not too much
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in the English case of Flight v. Booth ' the plaintiff was allowed
to recover money paid as a deposit on the purchase price of
certain premises. The sale was by auction, and by ignorance,
inadvertence, or accident, an important clause in the lease under
which the premises were held was misdescribed. Actions to
recover money are not the only "legal" methods of setting aside
the effect of a contract induced by innocent misrepresentation.
In Pritchett v. Fife 7 plaintiff and defendant exchanged certain
property. The defendant represented certain mules to be sound
when, in fact, one of them was disabled. Plaintiff on discovering
the defect tendered a return of the property received by him and
demanded that in the possession of the defendant. Upon the
latter's refusal, the plaintiff instituted a statutory action of
detinue, and recovered the property.
The court did not differentiate between "legal" and "equit-
able" rules., In In re Barnet Mfg. Co.,O however, the court
refused to allow a very similar action. The petitioners in bank-
ruptcy claimed that the goods they sought to reclaim were sold
to the bankrupts because of the latter's misrepresentations as to
their financial standing. The petitioners did not succeed in
proving that the bankrupts were aware of the falsity of their
statements. The court, while admitting that in certain cases
the innocent misstatement of a fact might "avoid" a contract,
denied that a misrepresentation as to financial standing was of
such a nature.' It is difficult to justify a separate treatment
to ascribe to a manufacturer of an article knowledge of its inherent
qualities. His representations, therefore, as to a quality that is not readily
discernable by others ought at least prima facie to charge him with both
knowledge and purpose to influence the sale.'
In several other jurisdictions substantially the same result has been
reached. Cf. Gunby v. Sluter, 44 Md. 237 (1876); McKinnon v. Vollmar,
75 Wis. 82, 43 N. W. 800 (1889); Montgomery Co. v. Atlantic Lumber Co.,
206 Mass. 144, 92 N. E. 71 (1910); Smith v. Columbus Buggy Co., 40
Utah 580, 123 Pac. 580 (1912). In all these cases there vwere also other
grounds for the decision.
61 Bing. N. C. 370 (1834).
78 Ala. App. 462, 62 So. 1001 (1913).
8 The court said: "A misrepresentation of a material fact by a vendor,
-whether made with a knowledge of its falsity or with intent to deceive or
not, is a ground for a rescission at the instance of the vendee, if it formed
an inducement to his purchase and was reasonably relied upon by him as
true (citing authority)." Ibid. 468, 62 So. at 1003.
9 11 F. (2d) 873 (D. Mass. 1926).
10 Johnston v. Bent, 93 Ala. 160, 9 So. 581 (1890) was very similar and
the same result was reached. The suit was for conversion of the goods,
which the defendant, assignee for benefit of creditors, had sold after plain-
tiff's demand. The court said the innocent misrepresentation of a material
fact was not a "legal fraud" giving a right "to rescind" at law. On the
other hand the opposite result was arrived at in Atlas Shoe Cu. v. l.,charJ,
102 Me. 197, 66 Atl. 390 (1906).
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of misstatements as to financial standing. It would seem that a
business man should be deemed to know his financial condition.
There appears to be no valid reason for applying different
rules in "legal" and "equitable" actions where both are brought
to obtain a return of consideration for in either case the defend-
ant is resp.onsible only for benefits actually received. It is
especially desirable that today, under the reformed procedure,
the old distinction between actions in equity and those at law
should be disregarded where the ultimate aim of the action is
the same in both.
Frequently when an action is brought on a contract the
defense is that the defendant was induced to contract by plain-
tiff's misrepresentations. In Frenzel v. Miller 11 the plaintiff, as
assignee, brought an action to recover on certain notes and to
foreclose a mortgage, which were given by the defendants in
exchange for certain property, including machinery. The
defendants by way of defense and counterclaim alleged that the
personalty had been falsely represented and warranted as being
in good condition, and sound and fit for the purposes for which
it was intended. The lower court allowed evidence that the
vendor did not know of any defects. The upper court reversed
the judgment, 'saying that even if the warranty be disregarded
the defendants had a good defense on the grounds of false rep-
resentations, though the statements were made without knowl-
edge of their falsity.12 It is a good defense to an action on a
promissory note that the plaintiff innocently misrepresented a
material fact.13
1137 Ind. 1 (1871). Followed in Brooks v. Riding, 46 Ind. 15 (1874).
12 Accord: Wilcox v. Iowa Wesleyan University, 32 Iowa 367 (1871);
of. Paine v. Upton, 87 N. Y. 327 (1882) (action to obtain a deduction
from purchase price of farm where by mutual mistake smaller amount
of land was conveyed than was contracted for).
In Bower v. Fenn, 90 Pa. 359 (1879) the plaintiff sold a drugstore to
defendant, Fenn, for $10,500; on plaintiff's misrepresentations as to the
value of the stock and fixtures, about which Fenn was ignorant. Fenn
paid $1500 in cash and for the balance he and his wife, the second de-
fendant, gave a mortgage. Some $7,500 being unpaid on the mortgage,
the plaintiff sued in ejectment. A conditional verdict was rendered for
the plaintiff for the land to be released on the payment of $1,500 and
interest, to be paid in installments. The upper court affirmed the lower
court's ruling that plaintiff's knowledge of the falsity of his statements,
but held that a conditional verdict was improper in such an action of eject-
ment, and the judgment was amended to give plaintiff possession of the land
until the rents, issues and profits should pay $1,500 and interest.
13Johnson v. Gulick, 46 Neb. 817, 65 N. W. 883 (1896); Walters v.
Eaves, 105 Ga. 584, 32 S. E. 609 (1899) (citing statute; see infra note 41).
But of. Hodgens v. Jennings, 148 App. Div. 879, 133 N. Y. Supp. 584
(1st Dept. 1912); Security Savings Bank v. Smith, 144 Iowa 203, 122
N. W. 825 (1909). In the latter case, however, there was strong evidence




It should be immaterial what the form of the action is. But
clearly, if it is an action which had its origin in equity, the de-
fense of innocent misrepresentation should be good. According to
Anson,14 in England an action for specific performance has been
defeated by a showing of innocent misrepresentation. Massa-
chusetts in Bates v. Cashkm n Is reached the same result. On the
other hand, in two early cases, Massachusetts indicated that such
a defense was not good to an action at law. In the first of these,
King v. Eagle Mills, 6 the plaintiff brought an action to recover
the price of goods, and the defendants set up false and fraudu-
lent representations that the goods were suitable for defendants'
business. The upper court sustained exceptions of the plaintiff
on the grounds that the court had not charged that knowledge of
the falsity of the statements had to be shown. In the other
Massachusetts case 17 the plaintiff brought an action for breach
of contracts and defendant set up false representations, itcr
alia, in that plaintiff alleged that the willows, the subject of the
contract, would be hardy and have a certain type of root. The
upper court reversed judgment for the defendant.2 These cases
do not seem consistent with the Massachusetts courts' attitude
in many of the cases where the action was for damages." Nor
are they consistent with other cases on the subject5°
' 4 ANsoN, CoNTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) 240. The case cited, Lamare
v. Dixon, L R. 6 H. L. 414 (1873) does not seem to support the author's
conclusion.
25 230 Mlass. 167, 119 N. E. 663 (1918). Commented on by W. W. Cool
in (1918) 28 YALE LAW JouRNAL 178.
16 10 Allen 548 (Mlass. 1865).
17 Pike v. Fay, 101 Mlass. 134 (1869).
'IS The court said: "But so far as the representations upon which the
defendant relies were of a promissory nature, relating to what would be
in the future, and so far as they were expressions of opinion, they are not
fraudulent, so as to avoid the contract, unless the plaintiff or his agent
knew them to be untrue, or made them for the purpose or with the intent
to deceive.' Ibid. 137.
:9 See discussion infra.
20 In School Directors v. Boomhour, 83 Ill. 17 (1676) the plaintiff ap-
plied for a position as school teacher but was told that one S had been
promised the place provided that she was qualified by the teachers'
institute that week. The plaintiff represented that the institute was not
qualifying teachers that week. The plaintiff was hired, but S was qualified,
and so was given the position. In the lower court the plaintiff recovered
damages for breach of contract, but the judgment was reversed on ap-
peal, the court saying, at page 18: "Whether his representations of facts
were wilfully or innocently untrue is a question about which we need ex-
press no opinion. The effect is the same, whether he knew they were un-
true or not."
In a number of other eases an action for breach of contract has been
defeated, or the recovery reduced, by a defense of innocent misrepresenta-
tions inducing the contract. Prestwood v. Carlton, 102 Ala. 327, 50 So.
254 (1909) (action for breach of covenant of warranty, which was given
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Actions at law for damages present the most difficult phase in
the field of responsibility for innocent misrepresentations. It is
well established that knowledge of the falsity of the warranty is
no part of an action for breach of warranty.2' On the other
hand it is generally said that for an action of fraud knowledge of
the falsity must be shown -. 2 2 It is difficult to reconcile the two
theories. It has been said that "a warranty rests on contract,
while fraud or fraudulent representations have no element of
contract in them, but are essentially a tort." 23 This distinction
is untenable, if it be regarded as anything but the statement of
the distinction betveen the forms of action that are used. Even
so it is not a fair statement for most jurisdictions allow an
action framed on the theory of deceit for breach of warranty.24
The situations giving rise to actions for breach of warranty are
often similar to those giving rise to an action for false rep-
resentations. It is, therefore, erroneous to conclude that a
warranty may be regarded as in fact a contract while all other
statements inducing contracts have no elements of contract in
them.
No knowledge of the falsity of the representations need be
shown in some states, 5 but even in Michigan, where this rule is
by defendant by reason of plaintiff's misrepresentations); Black v. Wal-
ton, 32 Ark. 321 (1877) (action for purchase price of land); Baugham
v. Gould, 45 Mich. 481, 8 N. W. 73 (1881) (buyer of land allowed to re-
coup damages for plaintiff's misrepresentation as to amount of land); of.
Kramer v. Bjerrum, 19 App. Div. 332, 46 N. Y. Supp. 496 (1st Dept.
1897). Contra: Zehner v. Kepler, 16 Ind. 290 (1861).
21 Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HArtv. L.
REv. 415, 417 et seq. Even though fraud and deceit are alleged they need
not be proved. Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446 (1802); Shippen v.
Bowen, 122 U. S. 575, 7 Sup. Ct. 1283 (1887) ; Wilson v. Fuller, 58 Minn.
149, 59 N. W. 988 (1894).
-See Baker v. Clark, 14 Ala. App. 152, 154, 68 So. 593, 594 (1915);
Peters v. Lohman, 171 Mo. App.,465, 482, 156 S. W. 783, 788 (1913);
Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 339 (1889) ; Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546,
551, 124 N. E. 144, 145 (1919); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 102 Mass.
221, 226 (1869).
23 See Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 227, 211 Pac.
991, 993 (1922).
24 See supra note 21.
25 Holcomb v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396 (1888); see Weinberg v. Ladd, 199
Mich. 164, 167, 168, 165 N. W. 711, 712 (1917).
Texas, to a lesser extent, holds the defendant, especially by statute.
For a review of the Texas decisions and statute, see Miller, Innocent Mis-
representatins as the Basis of an Action for Deceit (1928) 6 Tax. L.
Rav. 151.
The rule in Nebraska has been stated to allow recovery. See Foley v.
Holtry, 43 Neb. 133, 137, 61 N. W. 120, 121 (1894) where the court said:
"'To these requirements the courts formerly added another, to wit, that
defendant must have known that the representations were false. A
more accurate statement in view of the later decisions would be that the
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best established, an exception was made in favor of a non-
contracting party, who had not received the benefits of the con-
tract.
6 The feeling is widespread that a third party should not
be held unless actual bad faith is shown.27
It is impossible to reconcile the various decisions in the states
professing to follow the rules that knowledge must be shown to
sustain an action for deceit. Even the statements of the rule
vary greatly.8 But the result reached in Chathar Finzace Co. v.
Moffatt 2  seems to be in accord with the weight of authority.
The action was tort for false representations and the proof
showed that the defendant, who was the lessee of certain land,
procured a survey which inaccurately showed a large body of
iron ore. In making the plan, the surveyor to the defendant's
knowledge assumed that a certain line ran due north instead of
actually determining what the true course was. As a result the
iron bed, which was in fact situated in another's land, was shown
to belong to the defendant. The latter represented to the plain-
defendant must either know that the representations were false, or else
they must be made without knowledge as positive statements of known
fact. The rule as thus formulated practically charges the defendant
with notice of the truth in all cases where he makes positive representa-
tions of existing facts."
2
6 In Krause v. Cook, 144 Mich. 365, 108 N. W. 81 (190G) the court,
after a line of decisions holding the defendant regardless of his innocence,
held in effect, that where the defendant was an agent and received only
ten per cent commission he was not responsible for innocent misrepre-
sentations. In Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N. W. 581 (1008)
the court, with three judges dissenting, explained the prior decision as
based on the fact that the defendant had not received the benefits of the
transaction. In the Aldrich ca se, the defendant, being a party to the
contract was held for innocent misrepresentations.
2Many decisions can be thus explained. It does not follow that the
same result would not have been reached if the defendant had been a party
to the contract but the fact that he was not probably strongly influenced
the court's decision in the following cases. Cowley v. Smyth, 40 N. J. L
380 (1884); Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. E. 414 (1895);
Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East 92 (1801); Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. Co.,
163 Mass. 574, 40 N. E. 1039 (1895); Tucker v. White, 125 Mas.. 3-14
(1878); Tryon v. Whitmarsh, 1 Mete. 1 (Mass. 1840) LeLievre v. Gould
[1893] 1 Q. B. 491. But cf. Bulitt v. Farrar, 42 Minn. 8, 43 N. W. 566
(1889) where the court held an agent responsible.
28 " . . there must be sciotcr, either actual or constructive . . .
'Scieter' . . . means guilty knowledge, or a guilty lack of knowledge."
Peters v. Lohman, supra note 22, at 484, 156 S. W. at 789.
i. . .moral fraud is essential to furnish a ground of action." Cow-
ley v. Smyth, supra note 27, at 387.
"Although . . . a complaint seeking a recovery for injuries arising
from misrepresentations need not allege that the defendant knew his repre-
sentations were false, it is necessary that it should state facts showing
that they were fraudulent." Furnas v. Friday, 102 Ind. 129, 130, 1 N. E.
296, 297 (1885).
29 147 Mass. 403, 18 N. E. 168 (1888).
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tiff "as of his own knowledge" that the iron was within the
leased land, and showed the survey as a proof of his statement.
The plaintiff bought the lease but discovered the error and
brought an action, in which he recovered. The court said:
"The fraud consists in stating that the party knows the thing
to exist, when he does not know it to exist; and if he does not
know it to exist, he must ordinarily be deemed to know that he
does not. Forgetfulness of its existence after a former knowl-
edge, or a mere belief of its existence, will not warrant a state-
ment of actual knowledge."
The cases seem to be in substantial accord with the Chatham
Furnace Co. case in holding that the vendor of land should be
responsible if he misrepresent, though innocently, some material
fact in connection with the land.30  It is, however, practically
impossible to generalize as to other situations or even to
determine what the rule is in any one jurisdiction. England goes
very far to protect a defendant. It would seem that even the
most negligent conduct is insufficient to make a party responsible
if no actual knowledge of the falsity can be shown.31 It is doubt-
ful if any American jurisdiction would go so far. Negligence in
making a statement is generally "fraud" in this country.3-" A
rule has also been laid down that, if the defendant makes a
statement as of his own knowledge, he is responsible 31 Some-
times to this rule is added that he made the statement of his own
3 1Munroe v. Pritchett, 16 Ala. 785 (1849); Lynch v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 18 Fed. 486 (D. Minn. 1883); McFerran v. Taylor, 3 Cranch. 270
(U. S. 1806); New v. Jackson, 50 Ind. App. 120, 95 N. E. 328 (1912);
Krewson v. Cloud, 45 Ind. 273 (1873); Davis v. Nuzum, 72 Wis. 439, 40
N. W. 497 (1888); cf. Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238 (1860); Foster v.
Kennedy's Adm'r, 38 Ala. 359 (1862). See Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v.
Bamford, 150 U. S. 665, 673, 14 Sup. Ct. 219, 221 (1893). In practically
all these cases the courts convinced themselves that there was some
kind of fraud involved, but in most it would seem there was nothing but a
bare assertion of fact in regard to the land.
But cf. Baker v. Clark, supra note 22; Dunn v. White, 63 Mo. 181 (1876)
(plaintiff was aware of facts which showed him that defendant was not
sure as to the true boundaries); Tucker v. White, 125 Mass. 344 (1878)
(also contained other elements which would have made it unjust to hold
defendant).
n Taylor v. Ashton, 11 M. & W. 401' (1843) (defendant directors issued
-false statement as to bank's condition, and the jury characterized their
action as "grossly negligent"); Derry v. Peek, supra note 22; Glasier v.
Molls, 42 Ch. D. 436 (1889).
32 See Shackett v. Bickford, 74 N. H. 57, 60, 65 Atl. 252, 254 (1906);
Furnas v. Friday, supra note 28, at 130, 1 N. E. at 297; Munroc v. Prit-
chett, supra note 30, at 790.
33 Fisher v. Mellen, 103 Mass. 503 (1870); Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117
Mass. 195 (1875); Humphrey v. Merriam, 32 Minn. 197, 20 N. W. 138
(1884) ; see Peters v. Lohman, supra note 22, at 484.
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knowledge when he did not know whether it was true or false.3'
This really adds nothing since if he knew it was false, he is
obviously to be held, and he could not possibly have known it
was true. Under this rule, then, any positive assertion, if false
in fact, would make the speaker responsible. But the cases do
not go so far32  California:6 and Montana,3 as well as North Z'3
and South Dakota,39 have passed statutes enacting that it con-
stitutes fraud for one to make "a positive assertion, in a manner
not warranted by the information of the person making it, of
that which is not true, though he believes it to be true."
Alabama 40 and Georgia 2 acts provide that innocent misrep-
resentations of material facts constitute legal fraud. Georgia by
another section, -42 however, provides that for deceit, knowledge
of the falsehood must be shown, and an Alabama case 13 has
stated that the Alabama act is merely declaratory of the common
law.
If a party injured by innocent misrepresentations were
allowed to recover only the damage actually suffered, there could
be little objection to allowing an action for damages. This
measure of recovery is often used even where the deceit was
made with knowledge,44 so it would be no innovation. Even if
the measure of recovery allowed were the difference between the
value of the consideration as represented and its actual value, it
would be no more than what is allowed for breach of warranty,
where knowledge is not essential. Under the present system,
there is too little uniformity and too little protection to the
injured party.
34 Cf. Bullitt v. Farrar, supra note 27; Peters v. Lohman, mtpra note 22.
Massachusetts adds the requirement that the fact stated should be sus-
ceptible of knowledge. Fisher v. Mellen, supra note 33, at 506.
- See, for example, the following cases: Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins.
Co., supra note 27; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Matthews, supra note 22.
3G Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1923) § 1572.
n Mont. Rev. Code (1921) § 7480.
38 N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 5849.
9 . D. Rev. Code (1919) § 816.
4Ala. Code (1923) § 8049.
G' a. Code (1926) § 4623.
Ibid. § 4410. But negligence constitutes kmowledge. Ibid.
43See Harton v. Belcher, 195 Ala. 186, 190, 70 So. 141, 142 (1915).
41 The rule was applied in Derry v. Peek, sz.pr-a note 22; Smith v. Bolle7,
132 U. S. 125, 10 Sup. Ct. 39 (1889); Reno v. Bull, supra note 22.
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